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ABSTRACT 
 
 The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established with an 
alluring promise of enhancing the living standards of people around 
the world, creating jobs and spurring development, while ensuring 
equitable distribution of the fruits of trade, with particular regard to 
the needs of the poor.  However, critics see the WTO as a 
mercantilist system tailored to the commercial interests of wealthy 
nations and their corporations, with little or no attention to the 
interests of the poor.  What happens to agriculture affects the poor 
disproportionately.  If spurring economic development and thereby 
enhancing the living standards of people is indeed the WTO’s goal, 
no sector seems more significant to the accomplishment of that 
mission than agriculture.  Hence, probing the fairness of agricultural 
trade provides a special insight with which to judge whether the 
WTO is true to its word, and conversely, to evaluate the validity of 
criticism directed against the trading regime.  That is the aim of this 
article. It examines the WTO agricultural trade regime and 
concludes that the fact that agricultural trade remains the most 
protected and distorted sector, despite its unrivalled significance to 
development, is hardly a characteristic of a pro-development trading 
system. 
                                      
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite the WTO’s promise of increasing the standard of 
living of people across the globe through the creation of jobs while 
keeping a focus on the needs of the poor,1 it  is commonly accused of 
destroying jobs, shattering livelihoods, and generally being anti-
                                                
 * LL.M. (Stanford Law School), J.D. (Ghent University). 
 1 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter Marrakesh 
Agreement]. 
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poor. 2   Accusations against the trading regime are diverse and 
multifaceted.  Broadly, they may be summarized into two categories.  
At the interstate level, critics maintain that the WTO system is 
tailored to the interests of industrialized nations who have designed 
the institution and negotiated its rules.3  As such, it is often argued 
that while trade of industrial products (for which industrialized 
nations have comparative advantage) has been remarkably liberalized, 
agricultural trade, which is of greater interest to developing countries, 
is still saddled with protectionism.4  At best, the argument goes, that 
the system has failed to address the development aspirations of poor 
nations and thus the alleviation of human suffering associated with 
economic deprivation.  At worst, it ensures the perpetuation of the 
North’s hegemony in global trade.5  One may add that when that 
hegemony is challenged by the emergence of new powers, the WTO 
became unable to muster agreement or enthusiasm, as the current 
Doha Round stalemate and concurrent shift of focus towards regional 
trade agreement suggest.6  
Within nations, the WTO is seen by many as “a symbol of 
mercantilism, capitalism, the tool through which powerful 
multinational corporations impose their law over human beings, 
impairing their social, economic[,] and cultural rights.”7  Although 
                                                
 2 See Special Rapporteurs on Globalization and Human Rights, The 
Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Comm’n on Human 
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13 (June 15, 2000) (by Joe Oloka-
Onyango and Deepika Udagama). 
 3 See, e.g., MARC PILISUK & JENNIFER ACHORD ROUNTREE, WHO 
BENEFITS FROM GLOBAL VIOLENCE AND WAR: UNCOVERING A DESTRUCTIVE 
SYSTEM 122–23 (2008). 
 4  See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & ANDREW CHARLTON, FAIR TRADE FOR ALL 
44 (2006).  As a matter of fact, global average tariff on merchandise trade 
has been slashed from 40% to just below 4% during the GATT era.  By 
contrast, agriculture witnessed a reverse trend.  See MELAKU GEBOYE DESTA, 
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 7 
(2002). 
 5 See generally Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha 
Round Negotiations, 45 TEX. INT'L L.J. 573 (2010). 
6  See Craig VanGrasstek, Speaking Truth about Power: The Real 
Problem in the Multilateral Trading System, in BUILDING ON BALI: A WORK 
PROGRAMME FOR THE WTO 59, 61 (Simon J. Evenett & Alejandro Jara eds., 
2013). 
 7 Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., WTO, Towards Shared Responsibility and 
Greater Coherence: Human Rights, Trade and Macroeconomic Policy, 
Address at the Colloquium on Human Rights in the Global Economy (Jan. 
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the WTO’s raison d'être lies in the enhancement of economic welfare 
for all, many believe that trade rules are actually tailored to the 
interests of powerful corporations that wield strong lobbying power.8  
It is argued that at the WTO, governments essentially represent the 
interests of their respective commercial communities, while the poor 
have neither standing nor representation.9  
What happens to agriculture affects the poor 
disproportionately.  Around 75% of the world’s poor depend on 
agriculture as a source of income and livelihood.10  Agriculture is 
also critical to the urban poor and non-farm households who spend 
up to 80% of their incomes on food.11  In other words, agricultural 
                                                                                           
13, 2010) (transcript available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl146_e.htm).  The WTO 
dismisses such accusations as regrettable misconceptions about the trading 
regime.  See, e.g., WTO, 10 COMMON MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE 
WTO (1999), available at 
www.depts.washington.edu/wtohist/documents/WTOmisunderstandings.pdf.  
 8 See Kishore Gawande, The Structure of Lobbying and Protection in 
U.S. Agriculture 41 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3722, 
2005).   
 9 For example, despite the obvious interactions between trade and 
various human rights issues, no UN human rights institution or specialized 
agency (such as the International Labor Organization) or any other human 
rights body has observer status at the WTO.  See SARAH JOSEPH, BLAME IT 
ON THE WTO?: A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE 66 (2011).  On the other hand, 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and similar institutions 
have observer status at almost every single Council (including the General 
Council), Committee, or Working Group.  International Intergovernmental 
Organizations Granted Observer Status to WTO Bodies, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/igo_obs_e.htm (last visited June 14, 
2015). 
 10  See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008: 
AGRICULTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT 45 (2007).  Poverty is largely a rural 
phenomenon. Three in every four of the 1.4 billion people who live in 
extreme poverty, i.e., surviving on less than $1.25 a day (the main poverty 
line at 2005 prices), live in rural areas. Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.25 a 
Day (PPP) (% of Population), WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY (last visited June 14, 
2015). 
 11 See Alex F. McCalla & John Nash, Agricultural Trade Reform and 
Developing Countries, in REFORMING AGRICULTURAL TRADE FOR 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2 (Alex F. McCalla & John Nash eds., 2007); 
Jonathan Brooks, Agricultural Trade Reform, Adjustment and Poverty: 
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trade has a more pronounced distributional effect than trade in any 
other sector.12  Recognition of this enormous distributional effect is 
the point of departure for our diagnosis of the role of agricultural 
trade in development.  Likewise, agriculture’s economic significance 
for poor nations is remarkably higher.13  Agriculture is often a poor 
nation’s biggest employer; largest source of gross domestic product 
(GDP), export earnings, and tax revenues; and generally, the primary 
engine of economic growth.14  In 2009, for example, agriculture 
accounted for 58% of the GDP of Sierra Leone and employed over 
two-thirds of the work force.15  By contrast, for industrialized nations 
such as the U.S., Japan, Germany, the UK, Switzerland, and Belgium, 
agriculture accounted for no more than 1% of the GDP and employed 
less than 4% of the work force.16  
Agricultural trade policy reform is estimated to generate up 
to 70% of the global gains from merchandize trade reform. 17  
Conversely, although agricultural trade accounts for just 8% of the 
global merchandize trade, it is responsible for approximately three-
                                                                                           
Mapping the Linkages, in ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND POVERTY 9 (2003). 
12 In 2010 alone, for example, hikes in food prices have plunged around 
44 million more people into extreme poverty.  Food Price Watch, WORLD 
BANK, (Poverty Reduction and Equity Group at the World Bank, 
Washington, D.C.) Feb. 2011, at 1.  Meanwhile, the number of millionaires 
continued to grow.  See Robert Frank, Millionaire Population Bounces Back 
to Pre-Crisis Peak, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2010, 12:01 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/wealth/2010/06/10/millionaire-population-bounces-
back-to-pre-crisis-peak.  
 13 See Patrick A. Messerlin, Reforming Agricultural Policies in the 
Doha Round, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MULTILATERAL TRADE 
COOPERATION 3 (Simon J. Evenett & Bernard M. Hoekman eds., 2006). 
 14 In least-developed countries, agriculture on average accounts for 40% 
of GDP, 35% of export, and employs up to 70% of the workforce.  See id. 
 15 See Agriculture, Value Added (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS (last visited June 14, 
2015). 
 16 See id. 
 17 See Dominique van der Mensbrugghe & John C. Beghin, Global 
Agricultural Reform: What is at Stake?, in GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 115 (M. Ataman Aksoy & John C. Beghin eds., 
2005). 
2015 WTO AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND 167 
 THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF DEVELOPMENT 
fifths of the global gain forgone due to trade distortions.18  GDP 
growth generated by agriculture is up to four times more effective in 
alleviating poverty than growth generated by other sectors. 19  
Although industrialized nations dominate agricultural trade, 20 
developing countries’ agriculture accounts for two-thirds of the 
world’s agricultural value–added. 21   Therefore, the case for 
overhauling agricultural trade is compelling.  Agriculture represents 
the ultimate test of the development promise of the WTO.  In fact, if 
spurring economic development and thereby raising the standards of 
living of people is the WTO’s mission, no sector seems to have 
greater significance to the accomplishment of that mission than 
agriculture.  Therefore, probing the fairness of agricultural trade 
provides a unique vantage point with which to evaluate the 
credibility of the trading regime.  
By demonstrating how gross distortions in agricultural trade 
inhibit the development aspirations of the world’s poor, this article 
argues that the WTO’s ostensible goals have little relevance to the 
institution’s modus operandi.  It maintains that the fact that 
agriculture remains the most protected and distorted sector, despite 
its unparalleled significance to development, hardly bears out the 
declaration that raising standards of living is the WTO’s goal.22  Part 
II details the reasons and motives for agricultural protectionism.  Part 
III analyzes the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and explains how 
existing rules undermine rather than spur development.  It also 
                                                
18 Kym Anderson & Will Martin, Agriculture, Trade Reform, and the 
Doha Agenda 12–13 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 
3607, 2005).    
 19  See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008: 
AGRICULTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 10, at 6.   
 20 “OECD countries dominate world trade in agriculture - with over 
70% of exports and 75% of imports; least developed countries account for 
only about 1% of world agricultural imports and exports.” The Doha 
Development Round of Trade Negotiations: Understanding the Issues, 
OECD,http://www.oecd.org/agriculture/thedohad 
evelopmentroundoftradenegotiationsunderstandingtheissues.htm (last visited 
June 14, 2015).  
 21 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008: AGRICULTURE 
FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 10, at 3. 
 22 Agriculture is the most protected and distorted sector. See KYM 
ANDERSON, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., AGRICULTURE, TRADE REFORM 
AND POVERTY REDUCTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, at 1, 
U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.D.5 (2004). 
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elucidates why agricultural protectionism continues to derail Doha 
Round negotiations, seriously undermining the WTO’s credibility in 
the process.  It is argued here that addressing longstanding issues of 
agricultural trade is not only an imperative for the completion of the 
Doha Round but also represents a credibility test for the trading 
regime.  
 
II.   AGRICULTURE: A SUI GENERIS? 
 
Agriculture is heretical to the gospel of free trade.  The roots 
of agricultural protectionism can be traced back to classical 
antiquity.23  Since the medieval times, agricultural protectionism has 
always been an “institutional norm.” 24   Those who strenuously 
proclaim the virtues of free trade have always found ways to make an 
exception for agriculture.25  Even in the heydays of the free trade 
doctrine, as in late eighteenth century Britain, agriculture was 
protected with export subsidies and prohibitive import duties. 26  
Adam Smith observed: 
 
The law of England . . . favors agriculture not only 
indirectly by the protection of commerce, but by 
several direct encouragements.  Except in times of 
scarcity, the exportation of corn is not only free, 
but encouraged by bounty.  In times of moderate 
plenty, the importation of foreign corn is loaded 
                                                
 23 In ancient Greece, for example, grain trade was subject to stricter 
laws than trade in other commodities, and a serious mistake on the part of 
supervisory officials was punishable by death.  See P. Spitz, The Right to 
Food for Peoples and for the People: A Historical Perspective, in THE RIGHT 
TO FOOD 169, 173–74 (P. Alston & K. Tomaševski eds., 1984). 
 24 See Ken A. Ingersent & A. J. Rayner, Agricultural Policy in Western 
Europe and the United States, 83 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 788 (1999).  
Agricultural protectionism has likewise been the federal government’s policy 
in the USA ever since the country’s foundation.  See Cody A. Thacker, 
Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the Doha Round: The Search for a 
Modalities Draft, 33 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 721, 723 (2005). 
 25  See Kym Anderson, Five Decades of Distortion to Agricultural 
Incentives 3 (World Bank Agricultural Distortions Working Paper No. 76, 
2009). 
 26 See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND 
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 393–94 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of 
Chicago Press 1977) (1776). 
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with duties that amount to a prohibition.  The 
importation of live cattle . . . is prohibited at all 
times . . . .  Those that cultivate land, therefore, 
have monopoly against their countrymen for the 
two greatest and most important articles of land 
produce, bread and butcher’s meat.27 
 
Likewise, the reinvigoration of free trade after World War II largely 
bypassed agriculture.  Pre-Uruguay Round attempts to bring 
agriculture into the mainstream General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) discipline proved unsuccessful.28  Plausibly dubbed 
“the deal-maker or breaker,” agriculture continues to determine the 
pace and progress of multilateral trade negotiations.  It was 
responsible for the unprecedented protraction of the Uruguay 
Round.29  It also contributed to the failures of the WTO Ministerial 
Conference of 1999 in Seattle.30  Once again, it has emerged as the 
major obstacle in the current Doha Round, and is blamed for the 
collapse of numerous initiatives over the last fourteen years.31  While 
the recent deal at the ninth WTO Ministerial Conference has been 
widely hailed, there is nothing in the deal that shows progress 
towards agricultural trade liberalization.32 
Despite its unique potential for poverty alleviation, WTO 
members, rich and poor, remain stubbornly reluctant to open up their 
agriculture to global competition. 33   This appears paradoxical 
because, from an economic point of view, agriculture is no longer the 
sector it once was.  While it remains the backbone of many poor 
                                                
 27 Id. 
 28 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND 
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 314 (2nd ed. 1997). 
 29 At the Uruguay Round, negotiations “proceeded at a pace only to the 
extent it was permitted by the U.S. and the EC negotiators who were locked 
in a very intense political struggle over the issue of agriculture.” Id. 
 30 Agriculture is also a major source of trade dispute. See DESTA, supra 
note 4, at 7. 
 31  See, e.g.,, Tim Josling, An Overview of the WTO Agricultural 
Negotiations, in REFORMING AGRICULTURAL TRADE FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 62 (Alex F. McCalla & John Nash eds., 2007). 
 32  See generally Melaku Geboye Desta, The WTO Negotiations on 
Agriculture: What Next After Bali?, in BUILDING ON BALI, supra note 6, at 
111. 
 33 See generally Tim Josling, A Post-Bali Agenda for Agriculture, in 
BUILDING ON BALI, supra note 6, at 105. 
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economies, the sector’s contribution to industrialized nations’ 
economies has declined remarkably.34  The commercial significance 
of agriculture has likewise shrunk; its share in the global 
merchandize trade has dropped from over 40% in 1950 to less than 
10% in 1999.35  Yet governments seem to believe that agriculture is 
somehow special.  The WTO Committee on Agriculture concluded, 
“[s]pecific characteristics of agriculture need continued separate 
treatment within WTO.”36  The vexing question is this: why are states 
unwilling to place faith in the market when it comes to agriculture?  
The explanation lies in two related reasons: one epitomizes the clash 
between trade and nontrade concerns, while the other represents the 
conflict of interests between industrialized nations and their 
developing counterparts.  
First, agriculture is so distinctively multifunctional that 
comparative advantage arguments must be treated with great caution.  
Food security lies at the heart of agriculture’s multifunctionality.  
Food, which makes up approximately 80% of agricultural trade, is 
simply too essential to let the market dictate outcomes.37  Agriculture 
is also vital for development, employment, rural amenity, 
biodiversity, landscape, and environmental sustainability, in addition 
to its sensitivity in domestic politics.  Second, developing countries 
have a disproportionately higher stake in agriculture.   As the lifeline 
of many developing countries’ economies, a fair agricultural trade 
                                                
 34 See, e.g., Agriculture, Value Added (% of GDP), supra note 15. 
 35 See WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2008: TRADE IN A GLOBALIZING 
WORLD 17 (2008).  It should be noted, however, that the decline in the 
relative share is mostly due to the dramatic rise of trade in manufactured 
products.  Otherwise, global agricultural exports have nearly tripled over the 
last two decades.  See Farm Trade Rises Amid Continuing Concern, 
Committee Hears, WTO (Nov. 19 2009), 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/ag_com_19nov09_e.htm.  
 36 In 2000, a group of thirty-eight WTO members submitted a “Note on 
Non-trade Concerns” to the WTO Committee on Agriculture.  Fourth Special 
Session of the Committee on Agriculture, Statement by Australia: Non-Trade 
Concerns, ¶ 28,  G/AG/NG/W/59 (Nov. 29, 2000).  In their notes, they 
emphasized that “food is the most essential good,” that it needs to be treated 
differently, and that “every country has the right” to take necessary measures 
to ensure food security and other non-trade concerns.  Id.  Accordingly, the 
Committee concluded that agriculture’s unique characteristics warrant the 
decision to continue treating the sector differently.  Id.  
37 See Agriculture: Explanation, WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro01_intro_e.htm (last 
visited June 14, 2015). 
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epitomizes their longstanding quest for a pro-development trade 
structure. 38  Agriculture is thus the litmus test of the promises of the 
“Development Round.”39  Developing countries feel disadvantaged 
by past agreements and thus seek meaningful liberalization in 
agriculture, a sector many of them regard as their niche.40  They want 
industrialized nations to cut their massive agricultural support and 
prohibitive tariffs.41  Thus far, rich nations have been unwilling to do 
so. 42  They demand that developing countries reciprocate by 
dismantling their own farm protection, including measures that are 
meant to safeguard food security.43  Before turning to these issues, a 
few words on the concept and scope of agricultural products are in 
order. 
 
A.   AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
 
The GATT never had a definition for agricultural products.  
The evolution of the concept is rather perplexing.  Agricultural trade 
differs from trade in other products due to its historical exemption 
from the GATT disciplines on quantitative restrictions and export 
                                                
 38 See generally Merlinda D. Ingco & John D. Nash, What’s at Stake? 
Developing-country Interests in the Doha Development Round, in 
AGRICULTURE AND THE WTO: CREATING A TRADING SYSTEM FOR 
DEVELOPMENT 3 (Merlinda D. Incgo & John D. Nash eds., 2004). 
 39 Ostensibly, the development needs of poor member states lies at the 
heart of the Doha Round.  See WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 20 
November 2001, ¶ 2, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter 
Doha Declaration]. 
 40 Although the majority of WTO members are developing countries, 
substantive agreements were traditionally negotiated between few 
protagonists, while developing countries campaigned for preferential 
treatment, thereby undermining their bargaining power.  See STIGLITZ & 
CHARLTON, supra note 4, at 42–43.   
 41 Food prices measured at the farm gate in OECD countries are 30% 
higher than in international markets, making it impenetrable for exporters 
from developing countries.  Farmers in OECD countries receive annual 
government support of around $280 billion (mostly on dairy, cotton, and 
rice), which is more than three times the amount of official development 
assistance from OECD countries to developing countries.  See The Doha 
Development Round of Trade Negotiations, supra note 20. 
 42 See Ingco & Nash, supra note 38, at 39. 
 43 See id. 
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subsidies.44  The meaning of the term agricultural products may thus 
be gleaned in these areas.  Yet, the concept does not figure uniformly 
in the two. 
For the purpose of subsidies, until the Tokyo Round, 
agricultural products were lumped under the rubric of “primary 
products.”45  The 1955 Review Session amendments to the GATT 
distinguished between “primary” and “non-primary” products.46  A 
primary product was thus defined as “any product of farm, forest or 
fishery, or any mineral, in its natural form or which has undergone 
such processing as is customarily required to prepare it for marketing 
in substantial volume in international trade.”47  This definition was 
transplanted almost verbatim from the Havana Charter. 48   The 
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, 
and XXIII of the GATT (Subsidies Code), a result of the Tokyo 
Round negotiations, distinguished between “certain primary 
products” and other products.49  Agricultural products in the Code’s 
language were generally subsumed under certain primary products 
                                                
 44 See R. Sharma, Agriculture in the GATT: A Historical Account, FOOD 
& AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x7352e/x7352e04.htm (last 
visited June 14,, 2015). 
 45 Kevin C. Kennedy, Reforming Farm Trade in the Next Round of 
WTO Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 1061, 1064 
(2001). 
 46 See JACKSON, supra note 29, at 190. 
 47 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Annex I, ad art. XVI, Oct. 
30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 48 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana, 
Cuba, Nov. 21, 1947–Mar. 24, 1948, Havana Charter for an International 
Trade Organization, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78, art. 56 (Mar. 4, 1948) 
[hereinafter Havana Charter].   
 49 Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI 
and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 12, 1979, 
31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, reprinted in GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) 
at 64 (Article 9 of the Interpretation Agreement states, “signatories shall not 
grant export subsidies on products other than certain primary products.”).  
The term “certain primarily products” embraces “any product of farm, forest 
or fishery, or any mineral, in its natural form or which has undergone such 
processing as is customarily required to prepare it for marketing in 
substantial volume in international trade.”  ANALYTICAL INDEX OF THE GATT, 
ARTICLE XVI – SUBSIDIES 455, available at 
www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art16_e.pdf.  
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until the Uruguay Round.50  Yet, what precisely constitutes a primary 
product was not always unequivocal.  For example, in the EC Wheat 
Flour case, whether or not wheat flour was a primary product was in 
contention.51 
However, for the purpose of quantitative restrictions the 
exception under GATT Article XI applies only to “agricultural or 
fishery products.”52  Apart from that, we do not find the term 
agricultural product defined under the GATT.53  Confronted with 
definitional problems, the GATT panel in Japan-Agriculture held 
that from the long-standing practice of the GATT, products falling 
under chapters one to twenty-four of the Customs Cooperation 
Council Nomenclature (CCCN) could, in principle, be regarded as 
agricultural products.54  The first twenty-four chapters of the CCCN 
list included fisheries, and thus, the panel’s interpretation is 
consistent with the meaning of Article XI.55 
                                                
 50 Andrew Stoler, The Evolution of Subsidies Disciplines in GATT and 
the WTO, 44 J. WORLD TRADE 797, 804 n.12 (2010). 
51 See Report of the Panel, European Economic Community–Subsidy on 
Export of Wheat Flour, ¶ 2.3 SCM/42 (Mar. 21, 1983) (unadopted). 
52 GATT, supra note 47, art. XI, ¶ 2(c). 
53 See id.  Annex I’s Notes and Supplementary Provisions state that the 
“term primary products” includes agricultural products.  See id. at Annex I, 
ad art. XXXVI, para. 4. 
 54  Report of the Panel, Japan–Restrictions on Imports of Certain 
Agricultural Products, ¶ 5.1.3.2. L/6253-35S/163 (Feb. 2, 1988). 
 55 See id.; GATT, supra note 47, art. XI, ¶ 2(c).  The CCCN evolved 
from the Geneva Nomenclature, which came into existence in 1937 as a 
Draft Customs Nomenclature of the League of Nations.  It was replaced by 
Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN) in 1959, renamed as CCCN in 1974, 
and was replaced by the Harmonized System (HS) in 1988.  The first twenty-
four chapters of the HS Nomenclature edition (2002) covers, inter alia, live 
animals and animal products; fisheries products; products of animal origin 
not elsewhere specified or included; vegetable products (including live trees 
and other plants, bulbs and roots); fruits and nuts; coffee, tea, and spices; 
cereals and cereal preparations (such as flour and pastrycooks); products of 
the milling industry (such as starches, oil seeds and miscellaneous grains); 
seeds; industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder; lac, gums and other 
extracts; sugar products; cocoa products; tobacco products, and beverages.  
Harmonized System Nomenclature 2002 edition, WORLD CUSTOMS ORG., 
http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomenclature/instrument-and-
tools/hs_nomenclature_older_edition/hs_nomenclature_table_2002.aspx (last 
visited June 14, 2015). 
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The AoA makes a departure from the GATT tradition by not 
covering fishery products.56  Thus, cases like Tuna-Dolphin and 
others cannot arise in the framework of the AoA.  By contrast, some 
other (mostly non-food) products have been added to the HS list 
mentioned above.57  In sum, the scope of agriculture products is not 
limited to crops, livestock, and livestock products.58  While food 
products dominate agricultural trade, not all food products are 
agricultural products nor vice versa.59  
 
B.   MULTIFUNCTIONALITY OF AGRICULTURE 
 
Agriculture has always had multiple functions.  However, 
the term multifunctionality cut into agricultural policy discourse only 
recently.  The Rio Earth Summit of 1992 (Summit) was the first 
international forum that recognized the multifunctionality of 
agriculture.60  The Summit concluded by declaring that agricultural 
policies should be reviewed “in the light of the multifunctional aspect 
of agriculture, particularly with regard to food security and 
sustainable development.”61  There has been a significant debate on 
                                                
 56 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 4 [hereinafter AoA]. 
 57 See id.  The new additions include mannitol, sorbitol, essential oils, 
hides and skins, silk products, wool and fur products, cotton, and others. 
Generally, not only primary products (e.g., food grain, livestock, livestock 
products) but also processed products (chocolates, beverages, tobacco 
products), as well as fibers (cotton) and raw materials (animal skins) are 
covered.  Id.  
 58 See id.; Japan–Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural 
Products, supra note 54. 
 59 Thus, it is important to distinguish the two so that protectionist 
measures, justified on the ground of food security, may not affect trade in 
nonfood agricultural products.  Id. 
 60 See G.A. WILSON, MULTIFUNCTIONAL AGRICULTURE: A TRANSITION 
THEORY PERSPECTIVE 183 (2007). 
 61 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development; Rio 
de Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex 2 (Aug. 12, 1992).  See generally 
Teunis van Rheenen & Tewodaj Mengistu, Rural Areas in Transition: A 
Developing World Perspective, in MULTIFUNCTIONAL RURAL LAND 
MANAGEMENT: ECONOMICS AND POLICIES 326 (Floor Brouwer & C. Martijn 
van der Heide eds., 2009). 
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agriculture’s multifunctionality since the Summit.62  The debate is, 
however, beset by conceptual obscurity and skepticism.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) has been a pioneer in providing a theoretical 
framework for multifunctionality in agriculture and trying to map out 
its relevance in the formulation of agricultural trade policy.63  The 
OECD defines agricultural multifunctionality from an economic 
perspective based on two key elements. First, “the existence of 
multiple commodity and non-commodity outputs that are jointly 
produced by agriculture.”  Second, “the fact that some of the non-
commodity outputs exhibit the characteristics of externalities or 
public goods, with the result that markets for these goods do not exist 
or function poorly.”64  Therefore, according to the OECD, food, 
fiber, and other raw materials are subsumed under “commodity 
outputs,” whereas agriculture’s role in food security, employment, 
environmental sustainability and recreational amenities, tradition, 
rural landscape, biodiversity, and the like are classified as “non-
commodity” outputs.65  
However, many believe that treating food exclusively from 
a commercial point of view poses a serious threat to “non-
commodity” values of agriculture, including food security. 66  
Speaking at an event marking the 16th World Food Day at the height 
of the global food crisis, former U.S. President Bill Clinton stated 
                                                
 62 See generally Bruno Losch, Debating the Multifunctionality of 
Agriculture: From Trade Negotiations to Development Policies by the South, 
4 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 336 (2004). 
 63 See LEO MAIER & MIKITARO SHOBAYASHI, OECD, 
MULTIFUNCTIONALITY: TOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 5 (2001). 
 64 Id. at 13. 
 65  See OECD, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 7–13 
(2008).  In earlier reports, the OECD categorized agricultural outputs into 
“food” and “non-food” outputs, later switching to the terms “market” and 
“non-market” goods, and finally settling on “commodity” and “non-
commodity” output classifications.  See MAIER & MIKITARO, supra note 63, 
at 10. 
 66 Commodification of food is viewed as a theoretical paradigm that 
underlies the unprecedented expansion of corporate farming, known for 
heavy reliance on chemical use and agricultural biotechnology.  This may be 
antithetical to the sustainability not only of the environment, but also of long-
term food security.  See generally FRED MAGDOFF ET AL., HUNGRY FOR 
PROFIT: THE AGRIBUSINESS THREAT TO FARMERS, FOOD, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (2000) (providing a collection of essays regarding changes in 
agriculture). 
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that the world blundered (while negotiating trade agreements) by 
treating food as a commodity rather than as a vital right of the poor, 
and that contributed to the food crisis.67  That is, of course, without 
forgetting that states have a legal obligation under international law 
to respect and protect everyone’s right to adequate food. 68  
Furthermore, treating food as a commodity and food security as one 
of the many externalities of food production is problematic for 
several reasons.  First, food supply is the primary function of 
agriculture.69  Unlike environmental sustainability or rural amenity, 
food security is not something incidental to the process of 
agricultural production. As such, putting food and food security into 
separate categories of commodity and non-commodity functions is 
unconvincing since agriculture’s primary function of food production 
may not be cogently separated from its role in food security.  Second, 
unlike all other multifunctional outputs, food security is not a 
nonfood value.70  Third, food security underlies most multifunctional 
outputs of agriculture, from rural employment to environmental 
sustainability and biodiversity.71  Fourth, whether food security may 
be regarded as a public good is arguable.72  Finally, it may even be 
                                                
 67See Bill Clinton: “We Blew It’’ On Global Food, CBS NEWS, Feb. 11, 
2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
stories/2008/10/23/world/main4542268.shtml.   
 68 For more on this, see generally Destaw A. Yigzaw, Hunger and the 
Law: Freedom from Hunger as a Freestanding Right, 36 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 
656 (2014) (arguing that the right to food embraces both the right to be free 
from hunger and the right to adequate food, which should be treated distinct 
from each other). 
 69 See Food & Agric. Org., The Energy and Agriculture Nexus: 
Environment and Natural Resources (Env’t & Natural Res. Working Paper 
No. 4, 2000), available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x8054e/x8054e07.htm. 
 70  See David Vanzetti & Els Wynen, The “Multifunctionality’’ of 
Agriculture and Its Implications for Policy, in AGRICULTURE AND THE WTO: 
CREATING A TRADING SYSTEM FOR DEVELOPMENT 174–75 (2004). 
 71 While some multifunctional outputs of agriculture have intangible 
benefits, most are tied to food security, directly or otherwise.  Even though 
environmental sustainability is arguably the most crucial determinant of 
future global food security, biodiversity is also pivotal for food security, 
which is why “Biodiversity for Food Security” was the theme for the 2004 
World Food Day.  For more on this, see Marsha A. Echols, Focus on 
Biodiversity for Food Diversity: Expressing the Value of Agrodiversity and 
Its Know-How in International Sales, 48 HOW. L. J. 431 (2004). 
 72 See Vanzetti & Wynen, supra note 70, at 175.  
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argued that food security is not a joint product of agricultural 
production, as it can be ensured through international trade.73 
Article 20 of the AoA explicitly mandates that food security 
and other “non-trade concerns” shall be taken into account in further 
agricultural negotiations.74  This has also been reaffirmed by the 
Doha Ministerial Declarations. 75   This seems to be a positive 
response to those who accuse the WTO of coddling trade and 
commercial interests at the expense of legitimate non-trade 
concerns.76  However, harmonizing agricultural trade liberalization 
with attending non-trade concerns has proved to be extraordinarily 
difficult.  Few dispute the multifunctionality of agriculture,77 yet 
there is skepticism that some WTO members invoke 
multifunctionality disingenuously as covert protectionism.78  The fact 
that most agricultural subsidies in OECD countries go to large-scale 
farmers and corporate agribusinesses seem to bear out this 
skepticism.79  Indeed, a closer scrutiny of the issue suggests that 
disagreements on multifunctionality are often patterned along the 
lines of the subjective comparative advantages of nations. 
                                                
 73 The pinnacle of comparative advantage theory, however ideal, is a 
rule-based, predictable, and stable world, where each nation does what it is 
capable of doing best, and relies on the international market to secure 
everything else.  Hence, theoretically, a nation could ensure its food security 
without engaging in food production at all. 
 74 AoA, supra note 56, at 422–23.  
 75 See Doha Declaration, supra note 39, ¶ 13. 
 76 See James R. Simpson & Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Non-trade 
Concerns in WTO Trade Negotiations: Legal and Legitimate Reasons for 
Revising the “Box” System?, 2 INT’L J. AGRIC. RES., GOVERNANCE, & 
ECOLOGY 399, 401–02 (2003).  
 77 In the WTO context, multifunctionality is understood as the “[i]dea 
that agriculture has many functions in addition to producing food and fibre, 
e.g. environmental protection, landscape preservation, rural employment, 
food security, etc.” Glossary, WTO,  http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/glossary_e/ 
glossary_e.htm (last visited June 14, 2015).  
 78 See generally MARY BOHMAN ET AL., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., USDA, 
THE USE AND ABUSE OF MULTIFUNCTIONALITY (1999). 
 79  A large portion of the massive agricultural subsidies in OECD 
countries (90% in the case of the U.S.) goes to the richest 25% of farmers.  
WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2004: REALIZING THE 
DEVELOPMENT PROMISE OF THE DOHA AGENDA 121 (2003).  Thus, claims 
about rural welfare, employment, environmental sustainability, and other 
aspects of multifunctionality merit serious scrutiny.   
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1.   MULTIFUNCTIONALITY AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
 
Once a member country’s comparative advantage in 
agriculture is known, it is easy to guess its position on the issue of 
multifunctionality.  The so-called friends of multifunctionality 
(including the EU, Japan, Mauritius, Norway, South Korea, and 
Switzerland) argue that production-linked agricultural support is 
essential to maintain positive externalities and public goods 
associated with agricultural production.80 They believe that the Green 
Box is insufficient and therefore advocate greater flexibility.  These 
high cost food producing countries also maintain a relatively high 
level of amber box support relative to what is permitted under the 
AoA.81  On the other hand, WTO members that have a strong 
comparative advantage in agriculture, particularly the U.S. and the 
Cairns Group,82 believe that multifunctionality serves as a disguise 
for protectionism.83  Certain aspects of multifunctionality, such as 
cultural significance or rural landscape, are indeed difficult to 
reasonably value and thus are susceptible to abuse. 84  Like 
industrialized nations, developing countries’ positions on 
multifunctionality are heterogeneous.  Many developing countries, 
                                                
 80  See Jessrey M. Peterson et al., Multifunctionality and Optimal 
Environmental Policies for Agriculture in an Open Economy, in 
AGRICULTURE AND THE WTO: CREATING A TRADING SYSTEM FOR 
DEVELOPMENT 165 (2004). 
 81 BOHMAN ET AL., supra note 78, at 6–7. 
 82 The Cairns Group is a group of agricultural exporting nations formed 
in 1986 in Cairns, Australia.  Its members are: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, 
and Uruguay.  Since its formation, the group has lobbied for agricultural 
trade liberalization, and represents probably the most influential block in 
agricultural negotiations, other than the EU.  THE CAIRNS GROUP,  
http://www.cairnsgroup.org/Pages/default.aspx (last visited June 14, 2015).    
 83  Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla and Rashid S. Kaukab, Liberalizing 
Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 
INT’L PEACE, http://carnegieendowment.org/2003/03/03/liberalizing-
agricultural-trade-and-developing-countries. 
 84 See Janet Stephenson, The Cultural Values Model: An Intergrated 
Approach to Values in Landscape, 84 LANDSCAPE & URBAN PLANNING 127, 
127 (2009).  The concern here is that WTO members may inflate the cultural 
significance of crop production or other aesthetic values, such as rural 
landscape, to justify their agricultural support.  
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including members of the Cairns Group, are skeptical about 
multifunctionality, which they consider as a form of “special and 
differential treatment for rich countries.”85  However, these countries 
are still keen on the issue of development.  Many of them are also 
cognizant of their vulnerabilities, especially regarding food security, 
and thus cannot afford to object to multifunctionality altogether.86  
 
2.   FOOD SECURITY: THE CRUX OF MULTIFUNCTIONALITY 
 
Multifunctionality may be used as a bandwagon to smuggle 
various interests into the WTO. 87   Though it is true that 
multifunctionality is not peculiar to agriculture, there are 
characteristics that are unique to agriculture.88  Agriculture is the 
source of 95% of the worldwide calorie intake (fishing and hunting 
account for the remaining 5%).89  As such, agriculture is the bedrock 
of human security,90 and a nation’s survival can even depend upon 
access to food.91  Further, national security has historically been the 
major justification for agricultural protectionism. 92   States still 
consider food self-sufficiency as a core component of their national 
security strategy.93  In his address to the Future Farmers of America, 
                                                
 85 Briefing Note Regarding Agricultural Issues Raised at the Seattle 
Ministerial Conference, WTO,   http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/about_e/07ag_e.htm (last visited June 
14, 2015).   
86 The vulnerability of international trade to manipulation by powerful 
nations and the “North-South duel” is quite evident in agriculture.  However, 
WTO members’ sector interests are too diverse to fit into “North-South” 
categorization.  For example, whereas the Cairns Group embraces both poor 
and rich nations, both poor and developed nations are net food importing.  
 87 See Vanzetti & Wynen, supra note 70, at 170. 
 88 See OECD, supra note 65, at 10. 
 89  See Stefan Mann, Degrees of Jointness for Food Security and 
Agriculture in Multifunctionality, in AGRICULTURE: EVALUATING THE 
DEGREE OF JOINTNESS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS 159 (OECD 2008).  
 90 “There have always been two major components of human security: 
freedom from fear and freedom from want.”  U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 24 (1994).  
 91 MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK ET AL., THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE 440 (4th ed. 2013). 
 92  See PETER GOUREVITCH, POLITICS IN HARD TIMES: COMPARATIVE 
RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISES 46 (1986). 
 93  See, e.g., Aryn Baker, Desert Dreams: Can the Middle Eastern 
Country of Qatar Learn to Feed Itself?, TIME (Nov. 19, 2012), 
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former U.S. President George W. Bush remarked: “Can you imagine 
a country that was unable to grow enough food to feed the people?  It 
would be a nation subject to international pressure. It would be a 
nation at risk. And so when we’re talking about American agriculture, 
we’re really talking about a national security issue.”94  With a touch 
of hypocrisy, however, President Bush argued that American farmers 
ought to feed the world:  
 
I want America’s farmers and ranchers feeding 
those who are hungry, those who need foodstuffs.  
We’re the best in the world at growing . . . And, 
therefore, we ought to work hard to open up all 
avenues, all markets, so we can feed people. . . . 
There was a big debate . . . as to whether or not 
China ought to be allowed into what’s called [t]he 
[WTO].  I argued vociferously that they should 
be[.] . . . [B]y opening up Chinese markets to 
American foodstuffs, it will be beneficial to 
American farmers . . . we want to be feeding the 
Chinese.95   
 
The importance of food security in the controversy over 
multifunctionality can be gleaned from two facts. 96   First, as 
indicated above, while net food importing countries are keen about 
                                                                                           
http://science.time.com/2012/11/19/desert-dreams-can-the-middle-eastern-
country-of-qatar-learn-to-feed-itself/ (“[A] homegrown meal is not only 
possible, but essential for the Mideast country’s national security.”); 
Jonathan Shrier, Food Security Contributes to National Security, U.S. DEPT. 
OF STATE OFFICIAL BLOG (Oct. 28, 2011), http://blogs.state.gov/ 
stories/2011/10/28/food-security-contributes-national-security (“Investments 
made to ward off food insecurity and prevent its recurrence can prevent the 
vicious cycles of rising extremism, armed conflict, and state failure that can 
require far larger commitments of resources down the road.”). 
 94 Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President’s Remarks to 
the Future Farmers of America (July 27, 2001), available at 
http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/07/20010727-2.html.  
 95 Id. 
 96 Vanzetti & Wynen, supra note 70, at 169–70.  Food security is 
different, not only because it is the most crucial feature of multifunctionality, 
but also because it underlies other aspects of multifunctionality, as discussed 
above.   
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multifunctionality, surplus producing countries are generally less 
enthusiastic about it.97  Second, the credibility of concerns for many 
other aspects of multifunctionality is suspect.  This is particularly 
true with respect to the aesthetic values of agriculture.  For example, 
even though most societies were once predominantly agrarian, there 
is almost nothing particularly revealing about why agriculture is of 
particular cultural significance for some countries but not for others.  
Even the credibility of less controversial aspects of 
multifunctionality, such as environmental sustainability and 
biodiversity, must be subjected to scrutiny.  While agriculture has a 
unique potential in sustaining the environment, mainly through 
preserving biodiversity, it also contributes to its destruction. 98  
Beyond exhausting fertile soil and underground water, agriculture  
contributes up to 30% of greenhouse gas emissions,99 making it the 
second largest polluter. 100   Yet, countries that espouse 
multifunctionality have not necessarily been keen in cutting 
greenhouse gas emissions or the intensive use of chemicals in their 
agricultural sectors.  Nor are they necessarily sticking to traditional 
methods of farming either. 
Net food importing industrialized nations and developing 
countries are particularly keen about food security.101  However, the 
roots of their concern are different.  Net food importing industrialized 
countries are concerned about the supply side of the equation; their 
concern is mainly associated with international market volatility and 
export restrictions.102  Accordingly, they advocate a strong WTO 
discipline that helps ensure a stable food supply in the international 
market by, inter alia, prohibiting export restrictions.103  In their joint 
                                                
 97  While food importing industrialized nations champion 
multifunctionality, the U.S., the Cairns Groups, and many other developing 
countries generally oppose it as a justification for domestic support.  See 
Vanzetti & Wynen, supra note 70, at 3. 
 98 See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008: 
AGRICULTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 10, at 4. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Carin Smaller & Sophia Murphy, Bridging the Divide: A Human 
Rights Vision for Global Food Trade, in THE GLOBAL FOOD CHALLENGE: 
TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICIES 
112 (Sophia Murphy & Armin Paasch eds., 2009).  
 101 See id. at 9. 
 102 See WTO Comm. on Agric., Food Security and the Role of Domestic 
Agrigultural Production, ¶ 14, G/AG/NG/W/36/Rev.1 (Nov. 9, 2000). 
 103 See id. ¶¶ 39, 40. 
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submission to the WTO Committee on Agriculture, Japan and the 
Republic of Korea have emphasized that while trade liberalization 
contributes to food security by augmenting domestic production, 
“there is always a risk of import interruption” due to wars, conflicts, 
export embargoes or restrictions, and other unforeseen 
circumstances.104  Citing the 1973 soybeans embargo, they stressed 
that their concern was not merely speculative.105  Accordingly, they 
argued that since existing WTO law does not provide a guarantee 
against import disruptions, every country may exercise its legitimate 
right to use domestic production as an insurance against possible 
import risks.106  Their claim was vindicated again when, following 
the 2008 commodity price hike, many countries resorted to export 
restrictions in order to ensure adequate domestic supply or otherwise 
insulate their consumers from high international prices.107  
By contrast, poverty, rather than export restrictions, is at the 
root of food insecurity for developing countries.108  Thus, prohibition 
against export bans may not necessarily improve their situation.; it 
                                                
 104 See id. ¶¶ 17, 37, 45. 
 105 See id. ¶ 37.  The 1973 oil crisis triggered by the Arab-Israeli War 
was accompanied by a global food crisis.  Consequent to the US embargo, 
soybeans disappeared from the Japanese markets, and that forced the 
Japanese government to overhaul its national food and agricultural policy 
and embrace food self-sufficiency as a government priority. See Osamu 
Koyama, The Relationship Between Domestic Agricultural Production and 
Food Security: A Japanese Case, in MULTIFUNCTIONALITY IN AGRICULTURE: 
EVALUATING THE DEGREE OF JOINTNESS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS 184 (2008). 
 106 WTO Comm. on Agric., supra note 105, ¶ 5, 8, 45, 50. 
 107 Quantitative restrictions are still legitimate in food products, only 
subject to certain minimal conditions. The insufficiency of the WTO 
discipline has been exposed in recent years “when export restrictions 
exacerbated or even . . . caused severe disruption and a collapse in 
confidence on international markets.” See PRICE VOLATILITY IN FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURAL MARKETS: POLICY RESPONSES 25 ¶ 95, 97 (2011), available 
at http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3746,en_2649_37401_ 
48152724_1_1_1_37401,00.html. 
 108 See generally SUMITER S. BROCA, FOOD INSECURITY, POVERTY AND 
AGRICULTURE: A CONCEPT PAPER 6 (2002), available at 
http://www.fao.org/3/a-ae405e.pdf (explaining that poverty reduction and 
rural development through growth in agriculutre will provide access to food).  
Of course, there are also net food importing WTO members among least 
developed nations, and there is no doubt that they will be affected by export 
restrictions.  However, since food insecurity issues exist on both the demand 
and supply side, trade liberalization alone does not solve this problem.     
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may even do a disservice to them.  In a fully liberalized trade, food, 
like other commodities, would flow towards solvent regions.109  That 
means an average Nigerian with an annual consumption expenditure 
of just $279 will have to compete with a Luxembourger who can 
afford to spend $17,232 per year on consumption.110  On average, 
countries where more than 15% of their population is hungry import 
less than 10% of their food, compared to over 25% percent in food-
secure countries.111  Therefore, economic development is the only 
way to ensure food security for developing countries.  
It must also be emphasized that food security being an 
equivocal concept, protectionist measures may not necessarily 
enhance food security for households.112  In fact, although around a 
billion people in the world go hungry every day, ensuring global food 
security by boosting production has not been the priority of the 
global agricultural trade policy makers. 113   On the contrary, 
overproduction of food, generated by generous subsidies in rich 
                                                
109 Market forces facilitate the movements of goods to places where they can 
fetch the most competitive price rather than to places where they have 
greater utility.  Food is no exception.  Even during the Great Irish famine, 
food was exported from impoverished Ireland to England.  See AMARTYA 
SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 172 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1999). 
 110  According to the World Bank, the mean annual consumption 
expenditure in Nigeria based on Purchasing Power Party (PPP) is $279, 
whereas in Luxembourg it is $17,232.  WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT: EQUITY AND DEVELOPMENT 6 (Oxford Univ. Press 2005). 
111 This is despite the fact that food-secure countries spend less than half as 
much of their export earnings as food-insecure ones.  See FAO, THE STATE 
OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD: MONITORING PROGRESS TOWARDS THE 
WORLD FOOD SUMMIT AND MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 18 (FAO 
2004). 
 112  Food security may mean different things, depending on whose 
security is at issue.  According to FAO, food security “exists when all people, 
at all times, have both physical, and economic access to sufficient, safe and 
nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life.”  Food Security Definition, FAO, 
http://www.fao.org/hunger/en/ (last visited June 14, 2015).  In the WTO 
context, however, food security refers to the physical availability of adequate 
food at national level.  It is concerned solely with the supply side of the 
equation.  See Food Security, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story028/en/ (last visited June 14, 2015).  
These are radically different conceptions.  
 113 See Tesfa G. Gebremedhin, Problems and Prospects of the World 
Food Situation, 18(2) J.  AGRIBUSINESS 221, 222 (2000). 
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nations, has long been regarded as the “[r]eal illness of international 
trade in agricultural products.”114  As a result, discouraging food 
production now figures as a goal under the AoA.115  Blue Box 
subsidies that go to farmers are now coupled with conditions that 
require them to limit production.116  In sum, while governments are 
generally sensitive about food security, their sensitivity varies 
depending on whose security is at stake.117  Primarily, food is a 
necessity and only secondarily a trade commodity.  When hunger 
strikes, survival is at stake, not just security.  Therefore, it is critical 
that food security trumps trade or other considerations.  However, 
national food security shows almost nothing about what happens to 
the individual; hence, protectionist measures that are justified on the 
ground of food security must be subjected to scrutiny.118 
 
                                                
114  MEL ANNALD, INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE DISPUTES: 
CASE STUDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 64 (Andrew Schmitz et al. eds., 2005). 
 115 ARATHI BHASKAR & JOHN C. BEGHIN, HOW COUPLED ARE 
DECOUPLED FARM PAYMENTS?  A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 1 (2007). 
 116 See id.  The reason is clear: we live in a world awash with surplus 
food.  Global food insecurity (in the sense of dearth in aggregate food supply) 
is not a genuine problem today.  The concern here is rather that 
unconditional government support would lead to overproduction of food, 
which may, in turn, from a commercial point of view, suppress food prices or 
distort world trade in food products. 
 117 See generally Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: The Right to Food, ¶¶ 21–23, Comm’n on 
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/10 (Feb. 9, 2004) (explaining 
agricultural prices have fallen but consumer prices have increased).  Nations 
that regard food as a matter of national security should not suggest that they 
are equally concerned about household food security.  The appalling scale of 
global hunger is not a testament of any such concern.  “No amount of 
posturing by statesmen and bureaucrats and no amount of academic debate 
and dissection of the ‘technical’ issues can conceal the fact that the 
eradication of hunger and malnutrition has not, in practice, been a priority 
concern of the vast majority of governments.  The political will has clearly 
been absent.”  THE RIGHT TO FOOD 60 (P. Alston & K. Tomasevski eds., 
1984).  
 118 A WTO member that invokes food security as a justification for its 
protectionist policies must be challenged based on its records in fighting 
hunger and malnutrition.  National food security, like GDP, conceals more 
than it reveals about the lives of individuals.  Food security figures, in the 
most concrete manner, should be measured only at the individual level, and 
that ought to be the yardstick by which a state’s commitment to food security 
is measured. 
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C.   AGRICULTURE AND THE FALSE PROMISE OF 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
The historical discontent of developing countries with the 
GATT/WTO is nowhere more glaring than in agriculture.119  The 
gospel of comparative advantage preached by the North suddenly 
vanishes when it comes to agriculture.120  The enormity of economic 
gains involved becomes utterly irrelevant.  Agriculture represents the 
clearest embodiment of the hypocrisy and double standards about 
open trade and comparative advantage.121  Agricultural scholar Kevin 
Watkins writes that “[i]n the real world of agricultural trade, market 
survival depends less upon comparative advantage, than upon 
comparative access to subsidies—an area in which northern 
producers enjoy unrivaled dominance.” 122   The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) adds: 
 
Developed country governments seldom waste an 
opportunity to emphasize the virtues of open 
markets, level playing fields and free trade, 
especially in their prescriptions for poor countries.  
Yet the same governments maintain a formidable 
array of protectionism barriers against developing 
countries.  They also spend billions of dollars on 
agricultural subsidies.  Such policies . . . [deny] 
millions of people in developing countries a chance 
to share in the benefits of trade.  Hypocrisy and 
double standards are not strong foundations for 
                                                
 119 Investigations by GATT itself and various committees set up by 
GATT have shown how agricultural protectionism in rich countries harms 
poor countries.  See GATT, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: REPORT BY A 
PANEL OF EXPERTS 80 (1958).   
 120 Agriculture is “the only area in which export subsidies are [still] 
permitted; three-digit tariff levels are common . . . and a number of trade-
distortive . . . domestic support measures are still shielded from . . . [the] 
dispute settlement system . . . .”  DESTA, supra note 4, at 9.  
 121 See KEVIN WATKINS, AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND FOOD SECUIRTY 4 
(1995). 
 122 Id. 
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rule-based multilateral system geared toward 
human development.123 
 
From the inception of the GATT, developing nations were wary of 
the agreement and wasted no time in voicing their objections to the 
U.S. proposal. 124   Some developing countries even witnessed a 
decline in their export earnings after joining the GATT.125  As a 
result, they demanded equitable trade terms under the GATT 
framework. 126   Although the validity of their demands were 
corroborated by the GATT’s own investigations, the system still 
remains lopsided. 127   Indeed, given their peripheral role in the 
negotiation processes, it should not come as a surprise that 
developing countries suffer from systemic disadvantages in the 
GATT/WTO systems.128  Competition between unequals is unfair 
                                                
 123 U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME [UNDP], HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AT A CROSSROADS: AID, TRADE AND SECURITY 
IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 113 (2005). 
 124 Developing countries (then, mainly Latin American counties, as 
nearly the whole of Africa and many in Asia were under colony) objected to 
the U.S. proposal for multilateral trade liberalization in late 1945.  “Those 
that had been colonies had been taught by their parent countries that 
economic benefit was maximized by controlling trade and suppressing 
competition from alternative suppliers.”  ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 12 (1987). 
 125  Chantal Thomas, Developing Countries and Multilateral Trade 
Agreements: Law and the Promise of Development, 108 HARV. L. REV 1715, 
1718–19 (1995). 
 126  When the GATT could not meaningfully address its quest for 
structural changes in the global economic order, developing countries turned 
to the U.N.  Using their numerical advantage, they pushed through the 
General Assembly resolutions that were aimed at reforming the existing 
global economic relations, the most ambitious of which was the 1974 
General Assembly Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO).  The NIEO was based on the recognition that the 
existing economic relations were unjust and contrary to the U.N. Charter.  
See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201 
(May 1, 1974). 
127 “Just as there is a bias within the WTO against ‘non-trade’ interests, 
there is a bias in the WTO processes against developing States.”  SARAH 
JOSEPH, BLAME IT ON THE WTO? A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE 62 (2011). 
 128 See generally WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2011: THE WTO AND 
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: FROM CO-EXISTENCE TO COHERENCE 114 
(2011) (explaining that developing countries may be disadvantaged because 
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enough already; when the dominant parties set the rules of the game, 
the weaker players’ capabilities are circumscribed a priori.129  Yet, 
the hallmark of trade is competition, not cooperation, and agreements 
are curved out of cut-throat negotiations.  In view of this, the 
expectation that developed nations should be more benevolent 
towards their developing partners may be partly misplaced.130  
Developing countries face several handicaps in their trade 
relationship with the North.  First, in the face of pronounced power 
differentials, the very idea of a rule-based trading system is a relative 
concept.131  Second, although agriculture is the only niche for many 
developing countries, trade in high-value agricultural products such 
as coffee, banana, and cocoa is dominated by a handful of companies 
in industrialized countries and the developing countries’ share of 
                                                                                           
they are forced to accept rules that are inappropriate for their level of 
development).  Despite the fact that the GATT/WTO, unlike the Bretton 
Woods institutions, had a one-nation, one-vote system, developing countries 
had little influence in its decisions.  Crucially, the requirement of unanimity 
in GATT/WTO decision-making means that negotiations are more important 
than the actual voting, and given their limited market share, poor countries 
have limited advantage around the negotiating table.  
 129  See generally RICHARD H. STEINBERG, TRADE ENVIRONMENT 
NEGOTIATIONS IN THE EU, NAFTA, AND GATT/WTO: STATE POWER, 
INTERESTS, AND THE STRUCTURE OF REGIME SOLUTIONS 14 (1995) (explaining 
that powerful countries can force less powerful contries to accept particular 
solutions). 
130 Despite the rhetoric about trade cooperation, trade largely proceeds 
between profit-driven private traders (typically corporations).  This 
commonly realized point suggests that the corporate lobby is often powerful 
enough to trump the development needs of the poor and similar 
considerations. 
 131 In 1985, for example, the U.S., claiming that the activities of the 
Government of Nicaragua constituted a threat to its national security, 
invoked GATT Article XXI and banned almost all imports from and exports 
to Nicaragua.  See Report by the Panel, United States—Trade Measures 
Affecting Nicaragua, ¶ 4.1, L/6053 (Oct. 13, 1986).  Although Nicaragua 
complained and a panel was established, it was of no avail.  First, the panel 
rightly decided that it could not examine the validity or motivation for the 
invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii) by the U.S. (Art XI leaves no room for 
evaluating the substantive merit of the of members’ measures).  See id.  
Second, even if the Panel were to find the U.S. measure to be inconsistent 
with its GATT obligations, the ultimate remedy Nicaragua could obtain 
would be waiver of its GATT obligations towards the U.S., which had 
already been rendered meaningless by the two-way embargo.  See id. 
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these exports is declining. 132   Third, while no country has 
transformed its economy by relying on the export of primary 
products, poor countries processed products are subjected to 
prohibitive tariffs and non-tariff barriers in rich nations.133  As a 
result, trade in processed products is being increasingly dominated by 
a handful of vertically integrated corporations.134  For example, in 
2007, a pound of roasted Shirkina Sun-Dried Sidamo coffee in a 
Starbucks bag commanded $26 in the U.S.135  Nevertheless, the poor 
farmer who sun-dried that same coffee in Sidamo, Ethiopia, earned 
around just $1 for it.136  Because of the prevailing extreme level of 
market concentration and sharp technological disparities, the share of 
least developed countries (LCDs) in processed agricultural exports 
has dropped from a negligible 0.7% in the 1980s to just 0.3% by the 
1990s.137  Perhaps the most formidable handicap of poor countries is 
the lack of technology. 138   For example, from 2000 to 2003, 
agricultural labor productivity in LCDs was less than 1% that of the 
level in developed nations.139  With such a magnitude of productivity 
differential, it is uncertain if trade liberalization alone can address the 
                                                
 132 Just four companies control 40% of the global trade in coffee.  Six 
chocolate manufacturers that dominate cocoa production and trade claim half 
of the global sales from chocolates.  The EU countries alone account for 40% 
of total agricultural exports, up from around 20% in the 1960s.  In contrast, 
developing countries that were net agricultural exporters in the 1960s are 
now net importers.  See FAO, THE STATE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY 
MARKETS 30–33 (2004). 
133 See Hans Peter Lankes, Market Access for Developing Countries, 
INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/ 
09/lankes.htm (last visited June 14 2015). 
 134 See CORPORATE POWER AND GLOBAL AGRIFOOD GOVERNANCE 27–29 
(Jennifer Clapp & Doric Fuchs eds., 2009); see also WORLD BANK, WORLD 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008: AGRICULTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT supra note 
10, at 135.  
 135 See Stephan Faris, Starbucks vs. Ethiopia: The Country that Gave 
the World the Coffee Bean and the Company that Invented the $4 Latte are 
Fighting over a Trademark, FORTUNE (Feb. 26, 2007, 5:56 AM) 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/03/05/84013
43/index.htm. 
 136 See id.  
 137 See FAO, supra note 132, at 26. 
138 See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, 
THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES REPORT 2006: DEVELOPING PRODUCTIVE 
CAPACITIES 163 (2006). 
 139 See id. at IX. 
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needs of the poor.140  Yet, although the UN Charter and various 
international treaties oblige the dissemination of agricultural 
technology, the WTO agreements ensure the perpetuation of a 
technological divide.141  Fourth, while effective trade bargaining 
requires coalition building, the diversity of developing countries 
hinders them from forging a common front. 142  Fifth, developing 
countries’ traditional obsession on Special and Differential (S&D) 
treatment seems to further marginalize them at the negotiating 
table.143  In addition, poor countries have such limited representation 
in Geneva that their delegates struggle to grasp what is under 
discussion, let alone influence the course of events during complex 
negotiations.144 The WTO legal framework is so complex that it is 
                                                
 140 See generally id. (reasoning that trade liberalization alone cannot 
solve this problem).  In fact, some developing countries had been granted 
tariff preferences through various schemes, such as the Lomé Convention 
(replaced by the Cotonou Agreement in 2000), the Everything But Arms 
(EBA) initiative, and the United States’ Africa Growth Opportunity Act 
(AGOA).  Yet, the fact that these schemes have not resulted in enhanced 
agricultural exports from those poor nations to Europe and the U.S. suggests 
that the problem is deeper than tariff preference can cure.  ‘‘Today, the share 
of world exports of Sub-Saharan Africa . . . is less than one-half that of 
Belgium . . . .  If Africa enjoyed the same share of world exports as it did in 
the 1980s, its exports today would be some $119 billion higher . . . about five 
times aid flows and budget savings from debt services relief provided by 
high-income countries in 2002.”  UNDP, supra note 123, at 117. 
 141 See Nancy Birdsall & Robert Z. Lawrence, Deep Integration and 
Trade Agreements, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 128, 144 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999), available at 
http://web.undp.org/globalpublicgoods/TheBook/globalpublicgoods.pdf.   
 142 “Effective bargaining in [multilateral trade negotiations] requires 
coalition building, so that, aside from the United States and Japan, blocks of 
countries became the major players negotiating on all issues.”  Raymond F. 
Hopkins, Developing Countries in the Uruguay Round: Bargaining Under 
Uncertainty and Inequality, in WORLD AGRICULTURE AND THE GATT 143 
(William P. Avery ed., 1993). 
 143  Developing countries have traditionally lobbied for “Special & 
Differential” treatment; but “free ridership” often comes at a cost, and in this 
case their bargaining power is the price to be paid.  This means that 
multilateral trade negotiations will be conducted essentially among 
industrialized nations.  See generally STIGLITZ & CHARLTON, supra note 4, at 
43. 
 144 In the 2005 Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, for instance, 356 
delegates represented the U.S., while Burundi had just three.  As a result, 
after days of arduous negotiations when delegates became exhausted and 
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“probably fully understood by no nation that has accepted it, 
including some of the richest and most powerful trading nations.”145  
If well-resourced nations, including those that helped design the 
system and negotiated agreements, are represented by delegates with 
the highest level of expertise who still struggle to fully understand 
the system, how poor members that are represented by only one or 
two delegates would fare is easy to guess.146  Sixth, the very culture 
of negotiation at the WTO excludes many members from “important 
aspects of deal-brokering.” 147   Finally, the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and the 
Agreement on Technical Barrier to Trade (TBT) are viewed by the 
developing world as bottlenecks, as they reflect the standards of 
developed nations and may be employed for protectionist 
purposes.148  In practice, implementation of these agreements has 
proven to be costly.149 
                                                                                           
sleep deprived, those delegates in large numbers could take turns sleeping, 
while the rest “had to be on 24-hour duty.”  See OXFAM INT’L, BRIEFING 
PAPER NO. 85, WHAT HAPPENED IN HONG KONG? 5 (2005). 
 145 JOHN H. JACKSON, The Uruguay Round and the WTO: The New 
Organization and its Antecedents, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 1 
(1998).  
 146 See id.  
 147 “The negotiating culture of the GATT served to exclude numerous 
Members from important aspects of deal-brokering.  Policies and treaties 
were negotiated in notorious ‘Green Room’ meetings to which only certain 
Members were invited, and in which discussions were secret.  Green Room 
decisions were then presented to other Members as faits accomplis.”  JOSEPH, 
supra note 127, at 63; see also UNDP, DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN A 
FRAGMENTED WORLD, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002, at 118 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2002).  The green room refers to a process, rather than a location 
or physical structure. 
 148  See generally UNCTAD, International Trade in Genetically 
Modified Organisms and Multilateral Negotiations: A New Dilemma for 
Developing Countries, ¶ 128, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/1 (July 5, 2000) 
(“[T]he basic concept of the precautionary principle is already present in the 
WTO in several key provisions, such as the SPS and TBT Agreements.”). 
 149 Implementations of WTO agreements regarding customs valuation, 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), and intellectual property rights 
(TRIPs) are estimated to cost a typical developing country around $150 
million, which is equivalent to the annual development budget of many least 
developed nations.  See Dani Rodrik, The Global Governance of Trade: As if 
Development Really Mattered 30 (July, 2001) (unpublished paper prepared 
for the UNDP, Harvard Univ.). 
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In general, although developing countries are the 
overwhelming majority in the WTO,150 their influence has always 
been minimal.151  For example, almost three-quarters of the 108 
countries that participated in the Uruguay Round negotiations were 
developing nations.152  However, a few protagonists, notably the U.S. 
and the EU, once again mainly determined the outcome of the 
round.153  As a consequence, the balance not only in tariff reduction 
on industrial products, which was the traditional pursuit of the GATT, 
but also in all of the so-called new issues, was tilted in favor of rich 
nations.154  The four new issues added into the GATT, like Trade in 
Services (TIS), Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS), and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), 
unarguably reflect the priorities of developed nations and their 
corporations.155  What remains is agriculture.  Given the greater stake 
developing countries have in the sector, one would expect them to 
have a significant role in agricultural negotiations.156  However, the 
battle on agriculture was mainly a two-way showdown between the 
EU and the U.S.157  Many of the outstanding disagreements were 
hammered out by the bilateral agreement between the two powers in 
the Blair House Accord.158  
                                                
 150 See Understanding the WTO: Developing Countries, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev1_e.htm (last 
visited June 14, 2015). 
 151 See YASH TANDON, NORTH-SOUTH INST., TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AS 
A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT 71–72 (2002).  
 152 See id. 
 153 See id. 
 154 See Hopkins, supra note 142, at 143. 
 155 See id. at 160–62. 
 156 Interestingly, developing countries did not draft any special positions 
on agricultural trade liberalization during the first five years of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations; however, the proposal for compensation by a group of 
five food aid receiving countries (Egypt, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, and 
Peru), is the exception.  Developing countries’ participation was largely 
limited to reacting to the initiatives of others.  See id. at 149–50. 
 157 Power relationships between rich countries, especially the U.S. and 
the EU, explain much of the history of the postwar multilateral trading 
system.  See STIGLITZ & CHARLTON, supra note 4, at 43–44. 
 158 The agreement reached between the U.S. and the EU at the Blair 
House in Washington, D.C. is considered a momentous event not only for 
agriculture, but also for the conclusion of the round.  Of course, because the 
accord was bilateral, it had to be accepted by other negotiators, notably the 
Cairns Group, which traditionally advocated greater market expansion; 
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Undertaking costly commitments, such as those embodied in 
agreements on new issues, developing countries would legitimately 
expect commensurate tariff cuts on the part of rich nations. 159  
However, studies show that average tariff cuts in developed countries 
were actually much less than that agreed to by developing nations.160  
Access to rich nations’ markets for agricultural products, particularly 
processed products, is limited due to prohibitive tariffs and generous 
subsidies in those countries.161  
 
III.   AGRICULTURE IN THE GATT/WTO SYSTEM 
 
Agriculture contributed to and suffered from the Great 
Depression.162  Surplus agricultural production in the 1920s  caused 
prices to slump and brought agricultural trade to a standstill.163  
Governments responded to the crisis by adopting interventionist 
policies in the form of price controls, production planning and 
allocation of inputs, food rationing, trade restrictions, and others.164  
Such policies continued through the war and beyond.165  Farmers 
were impoverished to the point that they needed “the provisions of 
‘the welfare state’ that was everywhere being created.”166  Against 
                                                                                           
countries that opposed sweeping agricultural trade reform include Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, and the Philippines.  See TIMOTHY E. JOSLING ET AL., 
AGRICULTURE IN THE GATT 156–63 (1996); DESTA, supra note 4, at 65–66. 
 159 See J. MICHAEL FINGER & L. ALAN WINTERS, RECIPROCIY IN THE 
WTO 56 (Bernard M. Hoekman et al. eds., 2002). 
 160 See id. 
 161 Even in industry, developed countries subject developing countries’ 
exports to tariff rates that are three to four times higher than the rates applied 
to other rich countries’ products.  See UNDP, supra note 93, at 127. 
 162 See NEW YORK TIMES ALMANAC 304 (John W. Wright et al. eds., 
2001). 
 163 See id. 
 164 The U.S. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 is worth mentioning 
here.  This Act not only extended to producers of basic crops’ support prices, 
but also empowered the President to raise tariffs by up to fifty percent or 
impose quotas on imports if such imports materially interfered with the 
agricultural adjustment program.  See JOSLING ET AL., supra note 158, at 11–
12. 
 165 See id. at 11.  In the U.S. in particular, “following World War II, 
more than half of what the farmers collected in the market place for certain 
crops—such as peanuts and sorghum grain—resulted from government aid 
programs.”  PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 388 (11th ed. 1980). 
 166 See JOSLING ET AL., supra note 158, at 11. 
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such an existential backdrop, it is apparent that the architects of the 
multilateral trading system did not anticipate that states would open 
up their agricultural sectors for global competition anytime soon.167  
 
A. THE GATT ERA 
 
Agriculture was in principle covered by GATT rules.168  
However, it had effectively eluded any meaningful discipline for 
decades due to sweeping exemptions; in particular, from the 
prohibition of quantitative restrictions and export subsidies under 
Articles XI and XVI, respectively.169  Protectionism was at its height 
during the interwar period and came mostly in the form of non-tariff 
measures, such as quantitative restrictions.170   Thus, eliminating 
quantitative restrictions formed one of the priorities of the postwar 
multilateral trade agenda.171  As a result, GATT Article XI, §1, 
prohibits the use of “prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, 
                                                
 167 Agriculture is often considered “the GATT’s greatest failure.”  
JOACHIM ZIETZ & ALBERTO VALDÉS, AGRICULTURE IN THE GATT: 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO REFORM 10 (1988).  It should be stressed, 
however, that from the beginning, the ambitious plan to liberalize global 
trade deliberately left agriculture out of the frame of discussion.  Even the 
Havana Charter made exceptions to rules prohibiting quantitative restrictions.  
See generally Havana Charter, supra note 48, arts. 20, 25–28 (excepting 
“export prohibitions or restrictions applied for the period necessary to 
prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential 
to the exporting Member country” and “import and export prohibitions or 
restrictions necessary to the application of standards or regulations for the 
classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international trade”). 
 168 See R. Sharma, Agriculture in the GATT: A Historical Account, in 
FAO, MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN AGRICULTURE: A RESOURCE 
MANUAL 4, 4.2 (2000). 
 169 See GATT, supra note 47, arts. XI, XVI. 
 170 See generally Barry Eichengreen & Douglas A. Irwin, The Slide to 
Protectionism in the Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why? 871 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15142, 2009) (“[T]here 
was considerable variation in the extent to which countries imposed 
protectionist measures.  While some countries raised tariffs sharply and 
imposed draconian controls on foreign exchange transactions, others 
tightened trade and exchange restrictions only marginally.”).  
171 See WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31356, FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENTS: IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. 
TRADE POLICY 4 (2014). 
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taxes or other charges.”172  However, Article XI §2 declares that such 
prohibition does not apply to agriculture.173  Agriculture was likewise 
exempted from the prohibition of export subsidies.174  Article XVI §3 
only advises contacting parties to “seek to avoid the use of subsidies 
on the export of primary products.” 175   These exceptions were 
tailored to the agricultural policies of the major architect of the 
GATT, the U.S.176  Yet, the U.S. was unwilling to comply even with 
the minimal requirements of Articles XI and XVI, and it continued to 
pursue inconsistent policies until it eventually sought and obtained a 
waiver in 1955.177  Given its influence in the GATT process, the 
U.S.’s retreat meant that the issue would remain stalled until the U.S. 
itself would pick it up again.178  
The establishment of the European Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) in 1962 was yet another significant obstacle to 
agricultural trade liberalization.179  Conversely, the CAP forced the 
U.S. to rethink its position on agriculture and initiate the launching of 
the Kennedy Round in 1963.180  CAP subsidies not only transformed 
                                                
 172 GATT, supra note 47, art. XI, § 1. 
 173 See id, § 2. 
 174 See id., art. XVI. 
 175  Id.  These agricultural loopholes expanded further as GATT 
discipline on industrial products tightened.  In 1955, the U.S. was granted a 
waiver from its obligations under GATT Articles II and XI.  The EU 
established the Common Agricultural Policy in the early 1960s and 
consolidated preexisting protectionism.  Moreover, newly joining GATT 
Contracting Parties were keen to use the “grandfather clause” to protect their 
agricultural sectors.  See VICTOR MOSOTI & AMBRA GOBENA, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE RULES AND THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 34–36 
(2007). 
 176 Article XI is considered a multilateral embodiment of Section 22 of 
the U.S. Agricultural Adjustment Act, which sanctioned the use of import 
quotas for a list of agricultural products.  See Theodore H. Cohn, The 
Changing Role of the United States in the Global Agricultural Trade Regime, 
7 INT’L POL. ECON. Y.B. 17,  36 (1993). 
 177 See JACKSON, supra note 28, at 314; JOSLING ET AL., supra note 158, 
at 13–14. 
 178 See JACKSON, supra note 28, at 314. 
 179 See generally CHRISTINA L. DAVIS, FOOD FIGHTS OVER FREE TRADE: 
HOW INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS PROMOTE AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
LIBERALIZATION 227 (2003). 
180 See Alberta Sbragia, The EU, the US, and Trade Policy: Competitive 
Interdependence In the Management of Globalization (Apr. 23–25, 2009) 
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the EC from a net importer into a net exporter of major agricultural 
products, but also remarkably boosted the EC’s share in the global 
agricultural market as the U.S.’s share decreased.181  CAP policies 
proved to be major sources of trade wrangling, especially between 
the EC and the U.S.182  Interestingly, it was not long after it had 
obtained a waiver that the U.S. reversed its position and took the lead 
in the attempt to bring agriculture into a meaningful GATT discipline 
during the Kennedy Round, but without success.183  The U.S. tried 
once again in the Tokyo Round, but failed.184  In the Uruguay Round, 
the U.S., backed by the Cairns Group “mounted an almost do or die 
effort” to see to it that agriculture was integrated into the trading 
system.185  After dragging it out for years, the conclusion of the 
Round was in sight when the U.S. and the EC reached a basic 
agreement on agriculture in the Blair House Accord.186 
 
B. THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE 
 
The GATT Ministerial Declaration that launched the 
Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations in 1986 in Punta del Este 
resolved that the negotiations would achieve “further liberalization 
and expansion of world trade to the benefit of all countries, 
especially less-developed contracting parties.”187  For many less-
developed countries, no sector has greater significance than 
agriculture.188  Hence, examining whether, and to what extent, their 
                                                                                           
(unpublished conference paper), available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/33126/1/sbragia._alberta.pdf. 
 181 See DAVIS, supra note 179, at 273. 
 182 Thirty-five of the forty-five complaints under GATT against the EC 
between 1970 and 1989 relate to agriculture.  Similarly, almost two-thirds of 
the complaints against the EU during the first five years of the WTO relate to 
agricultural products.  See id. at 227–28. 
 183 See JACKSON, supra note 28, at 314–16. 
 184 See id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 See id.; see also Robert L. Paarlberg, Why Agriculture Blocked the 
Uruguay Round: Evolving Strategies in a Two-Level Game, 7 INT’L POL. 
ECON. Y.B. 39, 47 (1993).  
 187 GATT, Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, 25 I.L.M. 
1623, 1624 (1986). 
 188 Mike Moore, Dir.-Gen., WTO, Statement on WTO Negotiations: 
Agriculture and Developing Countries (Dec. 6, 2000), available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm47_e.htm. 
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interests have been reflected in the AoA provides a unique parameter 
to evaluate if the above declaration carries anything beyond rhetoric.  
The AoA is regarded as one of the most important 
achievements of the Uruguay Round.189  It is praised for putting an 
end to the decades-long neglect of agriculture.190  However, if the 
AoA is a success, it is more for providing a framework for future 
negotiations rather than for actually integrating agriculture into the 
mainstream GATT/WTO discipline.  Agriculture is still substantially 
more distorted than trade in any other product.191  Substantively, the 
merits of the AoA can only be judged by examining to what extent it 
has resolved longstanding problems of agricultural trade.  
 
1. STRUCTURE OF THE AGREEMENT 
 
The AoA is the first multilateral agreement dedicated to 
agriculture.192  It contains just twenty-one articles and five annexes, 
establishing generally applicable rules and standards.193  The details 
of actual quantitative commitments are contained in country 
schedules.194  The Agreement is structured along three main areas of 
                                                
 189 Josling, supra note 31, at 168. 
 190 See id. 
191 See generally Dimitrios G. Demekas et al., The Effects of the 
Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community: A Survey of 
Literature, 2 J. OF COMMON MARKET STUD. 97, 132 (1988). 
 192 It should be noted, however, that all GATT rules governing trade in 
goods still apply to agricultural trade.  See ANDERSON & MARTIN, supra note 
18, at 15.  With the establishment of the WTO, GATT, the de facto 
institution, has become history.  However, GATT, the agreement, is still 
alive, constituting one of the thirteen major agreements incorporated under 
Annex 1A to the agreement establishing the WTO.  See Multilateral 
Agreement on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S 154, 
175. 
 193 See generally AoA, supra note 56. 
 194 The schedule represents a member’s list of commitments and the 
subject of the committment.  See Guide to Reading the GATS Schedules of 
Specific Commitments and the List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm (last visited June 
14, 2015).  Regarding tariffs, for example, each member country’s schedule 
contains the commitments the country has made, including the tariff rates on 
each product covered, tariff ceiling, etc.  Id.  Schedules of concessions are an 
integral part of the GATT as explicitly stated under Article 3(1) of the AoA 
and GATT Article II: 7.  AoA, supra note 56, at art. 3(1); GATT, supra note 
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discipline, known as “pillars”, which include market access, export 
competition, and domestic support.195  It imposes essentially three 
types of obligations: to increase market access for agricultural 
imports, to convert non-tariff measures into tariffs (subject to 
exceptions), and to reduce export subsidy and domestic support.196  
The agreement also accords special and differential treatment to 
developing countries, albeit generally limited to lower reductions and 
longer implementation periods, rather than improved market access, 
as the preamble of the AoA suggests.197  
 
2. MARKET ACCESS 
 
Market access sums up the central thrust of trade 
agreements.  Trade agreements are fundamental concessions by states 
to open up their markets for each other’s exports.198  Market access 
has been by far the most important source of trade wrangling.  A 
cursory look at agricultural trade disputes shows that out of 127 
disputes and requests for consultation, 50 involved alleged violations 
                                                                                           
47, at art. II:7.  Schedules that countries agreed to during the Uruguay Round 
combined to consist of around twenty thousand pages.  WTO, THE WTO 
AGREEMENT SERIES 2: GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 2 
(1998).  
 195 Market access concerns mainly border measures on imports that may 
serve to limit the competitiveness of imported products in the domestic 
market, among other things; export subsidies are intended to achieve the 
opposite—boost the competitiveness of domestic products in foreign 
markets.  See WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 12–13 (5th ed. 2015).  
Domestic support, on the other hand, encompasses a range of support 
measures, including direct market price support to farmers.  See  Domestic 
Support: Amber, Blue and Green Boxes, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd13_boxes_ 
e.htm (last visited June 14, 2015). 
 196 See UNCTAD, Dispute Settlement, World Trade Organization: 3.15 
Agriculture, 3, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.32 (2003). 
 197 The preamble of the AoA states that “Special and Differential” 
treatment given to developing countries would mainly take the form of 
market access to their products.  See AoA, supra note 56, ¶ 5.  This, 
however, has not been reflected in the operative rules, including the 
schedules of concession.  See Josling, supra note 31, at 68.   
 198 See generally Free Trade Agreements, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 
http://trade.gov/fta/ (last visited June 14, 2015). 
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of Article 4 of the AoA, i.e., market access.199  Countries traditionally 
employ two kinds of barriers to restrict or ban the free movements of 
goods into their territories: tariff and non-tariff barriers.200  Of the two, 
non-tariff measures are particularly disliked.201  They are generally 
viewed as symbols of protectionism, discrimination, and 
arbitrariness.202  Accordingly, eliminating quantitative restrictions 
figured prominently in the priorities of GATT.  Nevertheless, 
exceptions such as those under GATT Articles XX and XXI are 
reminders that complete elimination of non-tariff barriers is 
unrealistic.  Still, phasing out non-tariff barriers was one of the major 
priorities of the AoA.  Further, the AoA also mandates the 
conversion of non-tariff barriers into tariffs,203 a process known as 
tarifficaton. One justification for this is that unlike quantitative 
restrictions, which tend to be arbitrary, tariffs impose an equivalent 




Article 4(2) of the AoA ensures that, subject to certain 
exceptions, ordinary tariffs are the only legitimate form of boarder 
                                                
 199 See Disputes by Agreement, WTO,  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm
?id=A1#selected_agreement (last visited June 14, 2015).   
 200 See PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, TRADE IN GOODS: THE GATT AND THE 
OTHER AGREEMENTS REGULATING TRADE IN GOODS 72 (2007).   
 201 Id. 
 202 Both tariffs and non-tariff barriers may effectively curtail the free 
movement of goods.  However, while GATT set out to eliminate quantitative 
restriction, subject to exceptions of course, it appears that eliminating tariffs 
in toto has never been figured as the objective of the GATT/WTO. See id.  
Trade talks on tariffs are normally about reducing them, not eliminating them 
altogether. See id.; see also DESTA, supra note 4, at 16–19. 
 203 Originally, the U.S. proposed a complete phase out of non-tariff 
barriers to occur within ten years.  The EU and rice-producing countries, 
particularly Japan and Korea, did not agree.  In the end, it was again the U.S. 
that formally proposed tariffication as a compromise.  While the EC accepted 
the proposal subject to a number of conditions, Japan and Korea went on to 
secure special privileges to delay implementation of tariffication under 
Annex 5.  See DESTA, supra note 4, at 63–64; Josling, supra note 31, at 169. 
 204 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_05_
e.htm (last visited June 14, 2015).  
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restriction in agriculture. 205   Tariffication has thus ended the 
longstanding agricultural exception to GATT Article XI.206  Crucially, 
it also requires tariff bindings and reductions to improve, or at least 
maintain, existing levels of market access.207  As such, agriculture 
has become the first area where nearly all tariff lines are bound.208  In 
addition, as the important footnote to Article 4(2) affirms,209 country 
specific derogations from GATT provisions, such as waivers or 
protocols of accession cannot be invoked to institute quantitative 
restrictions on agriculture.210  It must also be emphasized that the 
AoA even rejects customs duties other than ordinary duties. 211  
However, the trickiest part of the story is that tariffication generally 
resulted in exceedingly high tariff rates.212  Thus, the practical effect 
of tariffication in addressing the problem of market access has been 
unremarkable.  
Article 4(2) is not without exceptions.  Quantitative 
restrictions may be provisionally employed for safeguard purposes in 
accordance with Article 5. 213  Annex 5 to the AoA contains further 
exceptions to the tariffication requirement.214  In both cases the 
                                                
 205 AoA, supra note 56, at art. 4(2). 
 206 For more information on measures that must be converted into 
ordinary customs duties under Article 4(2), see id. at n.1. 
 207  Tariff bindings refers to tariff ceilings beyond which countries 
cannot raise tariffs.  Additionally, member countries have committed to cut 
average tariff levels by 36% and tariffs per product by a minimum of 15%.  
Two-thirds of these percentage rates apply to developing nations.  
 208 DESTA, supra note 4, at 66–67. 
 209 See AoA, supra note 56, at art. 4(2) n.1. 
 210 See Josling, supra note 31, at 180. 
 211  What so-called ordinary customs duties refers to is not clear; 
however, footnote 1 of Art 4(2) explains that such restrictions include 
variable import levies, minimum import prices, and voluntary export 
restraints, which are basically forms of customs duties and are not considered 
as ordinary customs duties.  See AoA, supra note 56, at art. 4(2) n.1.  
 212 DESTA, supra note 4, at 75–76. 
 213 The idea here is that the removal of quantitative restrictions might 
trigger import surges, in which case the country concerned is allowed to use 
safeguard measures to deal with the situation.  This is in addition to GATT 
exceptions that are applicable to any trade in goods, such as those under 
Articles VI (antidumping), XII (safeguards), XIX (emergency), XX (general 
exceptions), and XXI (national security).  See AoA, supra note 56, at art. 5.  
 214 Annex 5 to the agreement covers products that have been designated 
as meriting special treatment, mainly on account of their vitality for food 
security.  See id. 
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criteria are clearly specified.215  Also, in regards to food products, 
export restrictions are legitimate under Article 12, subject to the 
obligation to give due consideration to the effects of such 
prohibitions or restrictions on importing members’ food security, 
giving advance notice in writing, and consultation upon request with 
other WTO members. 216  Developing countries that are not net 
exporters of the foodstuff in issue are exempt altogether.217  
 
b. Tariff Reduction 
 
Tariffication per se does not improve market access; the 
tariff must also be low.  However, in many instances agricultural 
tariff rates today are almost as high as before the Uruguay Round,218 
and in some cases are even higher.219  Countries used a range of 
avenues to manipulate commitments made and set their tariffs as 
high as possible.  For one, the base period chosen (1986–1988) “was 
a time of very high protection levels.”220  Second, the actual process 
of tariffication was left to individual members.221  Thus, countries 
easily inflated their domestic prices while understating world prices 
to result in tariff rates which were more protectionist than nontariff 
barriers were during the base period. 222   Tariff reduction 
commitments also allow a degree of flexibility.  While members have 
agreed to reduce tariffs by an average of 36%, they can still maintain 
relatively high tariffs with just 15% reduction on sensitive 
products.223  
Importantly, processed agricultural products are subjected to 
significantly higher tariffs than raw products.  For example, in 
                                                
 215 See id. 
 216 See id. 
 217 See id. at art. 12(2). 
 218  See Tariffs: More Binding and Closer to Zero, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ 
tif_e/agrm2_e.htm (last visited June 14, 2015). 
 219 See id.  
220  KAREN Z. ACKERMAN ET AL., USDA, AGRICULTURE IN THE 
WTO 8 (1998). 
 221 See ANITA REGMI ET AL., USDA, MARKET ACCESS FOR HIGH-VALUE 
FOOD 1, 4 (2005). 
222 See id. 
223 See Juan A. Marchetti & Martin Roy, The TISA Initiative: An 
Overview of Market Access Issues 6–14 (World Trade Org. Econ. Research 
and Stat. Div., Staff Working Paper ERSD-2013-11, 2003). 
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Canada processed food products are subject to tariffs that are twelve 
times higher than first stage products.224  The EU imposes tariffs 
from 0% to 9% on cocoa paste, but it grows to 30% on the final 
product. 225  It is clear that such tariff escalation excludes poor 
countries from high-value agricultural market, and hinders their 
integration into the global economy.  Therefore, it is no wonder that 
the share of LCDs in processed agricultural exports has declined over 
the years.226 
In sum, although there are issues associated with tariff 
choices, tariffication may have made agricultural trade more 
transparent. 227  Yet, high tariffs coupled with an array of domestic 
support leave much to be desired in terms of actual market openings 
in the sector.  Tariffs on agricultural imports remain up to three times 
higher than those on industrial products.228  Such an asymmetric 
tariff structure is clearly unhelpful for many poor countries that rely 
heavily on agricultural exports.  More puzzling is the fact that tariffs 
on tropical agricultural products are generally higher than those on 
temperate zone agricultural products.229  Substantively, the AoA has 
not addressed the massive trade imbalance against developing 
countries.230  For all its achievements, the Uruguay Round is thus 
criticized as skewed and disappointing for developing nations.231  
                                                
 224 UNDP, supra note 123, at 127. 
 225 Id. 
 226 SEE HAROLD M. HARRIS, JR. & GEOFFREY A. BENSON, SOUTHERN 
EXTENSION INT’L TRADE TASK FORCE, SOUTHERN AGRICULTURE IN A WORLD 
ECONOMY, 8, SRDC No. 198-1 (2013).  
 227 See WTO, MARKET ACCESS FOR GOODS AND NON-AGRICULTURAL 
MARKET ACCESS (NAMA) NEGOTIATIONS 92–93 (2012); see generally Harry 
de Gorter & Erika Kliauga, Reducing Tariff Versus Expanding Tariff Rate 
Quotas, in Anderson & Martin, supra note 18, at 17 (explaining that there 
are issues of transparency and clarity in the implementation processes for 
tariffs). 
 228 See Josling, supra note 31, at 105. 
 229  OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER & FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURE AND THE RIGHT TO FOOD 12–13 
(2009). 
 230 See Anderson & Martin, supra note 18, at 7–12 (as noted above, 
agriculture is the only area most poor nations can hope to gain a fair share of 
the fruits of international trade, and as the Uruguay Round agreements offer 
little for such hope to materialize, sights are set on Doha, which so far has 
unfortuantely failed to redeem past inequalities).    
 231 See Julio J. Nogués, Agricultural Exporters in a Protectionist World: 
Review and Policy Implications of Barriers against Marcosur 9 (Inst. for the 
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While some export-oriented truly developing countries have 
benefited, many of them are net losers of the Round.232  
 
3. EXPORT COMPETITION 
 
In the beginning, Article XVI of the GATT did not prohibit 
the use of subsidies in all products.233  It contained modest, if not 
meaningless, requirements of notification and consultation.234  The 
absence of any meaningful restraint on subsidies tended to cancel out 
the achievements gained through tariff reduction.  As a result, the 
1955 amendment expanded Article XVI to include more specific 
prohibitions on export subsidies.235  Article 3 of the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) has 
reinforced this prohibition. 236   Export subsidies are prohibited 
because they may result in “dumping,” i.e., products being sold in 
foreign markets for far less than their cost of production.237  Dumping 
has long been considered an unfair trade practice because it distorts 
                                                                                           
Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean, Working Paper 16, 2004); 
Watkins, supra note 124, at 4 (“The Uruguay Round will not substantially 
alter this [biased] position, except to enhance the advantage of the northern 
agriculture…the subsidy systems of the  major industrial countries will 
remain intact, while developing countries will be required to further 
liberalize access to their markets. This imbalance is not widely recognized in 
developing countries, where the UR [Uruguay Round] agreement has been 
welcomed as the first step towards a more stable food trading system. But 
like most acts of fraud, the UR agreement is better understood by its 
architects, in this case the EU and the US, than by its victims.”). 
 232 STIGLITZ & CHARLTON, supra note 4, at 46–47 (estimating that the 
least forty-eight developed countries will sustain an annual loss of $600 
million as a result of the Uruguay Round). 
 233 See LARS BRINK, COMMITMENTS UNDER THE WTO AGREEMENT ON 
AGRICULTURE AND THE DOHA DRAFT MODALITIES: HOW DO THEY COMPARE 
TO CURRENT POLICY? 27–34 (2014). 
 234 See DESTA, supra note 4, at 103. 
 235 See generally id. at 99 (“If the term ‘trade war’ has been used in 
connection with the GATT/WTO system . . . a substantial majority of cases 
must have been related to the sphere of agricultural trade in general and 
export subsidies in particular.”).  
 236 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14. 
 237 See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement), 1868 
U.N.T.S. 201. 
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fair competition, entitling the affected party to respond by the use of 
anti-dumping and countervailing duties.238  In agriculture, however, 
export subsidies have always been legitimate within the “equitable 
share” provision in Article XVI of the GATT.239 
The AoA does not prohibit export subsidies either—a 
cynical view may be that an agreement that was carved essentially 
out of an accord between two major subsidizers and exporters of 
agriculture; i.e., the EU and U.S., could not be expected to prohibit 
export subsidy in the first place.  Both parties are still firm on 
maintaining agricultural support, and subsidy was not the issue that 
principally divided them.240  The fact that both the U.S. and EU 
strongly sought the renewal of the peace clause during the Doha 
negotiations is an indication of their desire to maintain their 
agricultural subsidies.241  However, the AoA subjects subsidies to 
reduction.  Article 9 enumerates the types of subsidies subject to 
reduction, while actual reduction commitments are contained in 
country schedules. 242   Reduction commitments under Article 
9.2(b)(iv) require developed countries to cut budgetary outlays by 
36% and the quantities of subsidized exports by 21% over a six-year 
period based on their 1986–1990 levels.243  Developing countries 
must cut their budgetary outlays and quantities of subsidized exports 
by 24% and 14% respectively, two-thirds of the rate for developed 
countries, over a ten-year period, while least-developed members are 
exempt altogether.244  
                                                
 238 JACKSON, supra note 28, at 247–77. 
 239 See R. Pearce & R. Sharma, Export Subsidies, in MULTILATERAL 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRICULTURE: A RESOURCE MANUAL 3.3 (2002). 
 240  RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 94 (3d. ed., 2008) (explaining that the EU and the 
U.S. have differences on the definition of export subsidy.  The EU accounts 
for around 90% of direct export subsidies paid by the developed world.  
However, the EU accuses the U.S. of using food aid and other forms of 
support programs (amounting to indirect export subsidy), which, when 
combined, makes the U.S. an even larger subsidizer). 
 241 See Matthew C. Porterfield, U.S. Farm Subsidies and the Expiration 
of the WTO's Peace Clause, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1002, 1032 (2006). 
 242 See AoA, supra note 56, at art. 9.  
 243 See id. 
 244 See id. (noting that art 9.2(b) allows flexibility in implementation).  
From 1996 to 1999, a country could exceed its export subsidy commitments 
or carryover unused subsidies as long as the cumulative export subsidy did 
not exceed the total commitments in its schedule and netiher the annual 
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On the surface, poor countries are free riders as far as export 
subsidy commitments are concerned.  In reality, however, they 
cannot afford to maintain meaningful subsidies in the first place; 
most of them cannot even afford to exempt the sector from 
taxation. 245   It is well known that all developed nations have 
historically used subsidies (and other forms of protectionist measures) 
until they ensured that their industries were ready for global 
competition.246  Accordingly, it is argued that reducing subsidies 
adversely and disproportionately affects developing countries in the 
long term.247  However, at present not only are poor countries unable 
to maintain subsidies even to the permitted level, but their primary 
preoccupation is market access; accordingly, they generally favor 
reduction or the elimination of subsidies.248  Yet studies show that 
after the implementation period, agricultural subsidies in OECD 
countries remains staggeringly high.249  According to the UNDP, 
 
The basic problem to be addressed in the WTO 
negotiations on agriculture can be summarized in 
three words: rich country subsidies.  In the last 
round . . . rich countries promised to cut 
agricultural subsidies.  Since then, they have 
increased them.  They now spend just over $1 
billion a year on aid to agriculture in poor countries, 
and just under $1 billion a day subsidizing 
overproduction at home—a less appropriate 
ordering of priorities is difficult to imagine.250  
 
                                                                                           
budgetary outlay nor the subsidized exports exceeded 3% or 1.7% of the base 
period quantities, respectively. See id. 
 245 See FAO, THE STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE: AGRICULTURAL 
TRADE AND POVERTY: CAN TRADE WORK FOR THE POOR? 27 (2005). 
 246 Id. at 26–27. 
 247 See generally UNDP, supra note 126, at 131–135 (explaining the 
argument related to the broader discontent that WTO rules deny developing 
countries the right to do what industrialized nations have done while they 
were developing, stifle competition, and ensure that developed counties 
continue to get benefits,  while developing countries reinforce the disparity). 
 248 FAO, supra note 245, at 24–28. 
 249 See Editorial, A Disgraceful Farm Bill, N.Y. TIMES,  May 16, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/16/opinion/16fri3.html?_r=0. 
 250 UNDP, supra note 123, at 10. 
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For example, in the early 2000s a dairy cow in the EU received a 
daily subsidy greater than the per capita daily income of around half 
of the world’s population.251  Through such heavy-handed subsidies, 
rich nations not only deprive their poor counterparts of export 
earnings that they desperately need, but they also compound the 
misery of producers in poor countries by driving them out of their 
own markets.252  It has been found that some agricultural subsidies 
provided by the rich countries are inconsistent with the AoA.253  
Brazil successfully challenged the U.S. cotton subsidy before the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in the US-Upland Cotton 
case.254  The panel found that the U.S. had provided several forms of 
prohibited subsidies worth billions of dollars.255  The panel’s finding 
was upheld by the appellate body, with only slight modification, and 
was subsequently adopted by the DSB.256  However, the U.S. refused 
to comply with the DSB recommendations to withdraw subsidies that 
had been found inconsistent with its WTO obligations.257  Brazil 
subsequently secured authorization to retaliate before the disputing 
parties agreed on a framework for working out solutions to the 
dispute.258  The long-awaited U.S. Agricultural Act, signed into law 
in February of 2014, eliminated direct support to farmers. 259  
However, the Act also introduced several new programs that protect 
                                                
 251 Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, supra note 120, ¶ 16. 
 252 See Nsongurua J. Udombana, A Question of Justice: The WTO, 
Africa, and Countermeasures for Breaches of International Trade 
Obligations, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1153, 1173 (2005). 
 253 See LIZ STUART, OXFAM INT’L, TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES: WHY THE 
EU AND THE USA MUST REFORM THEIR SUBSIDIES OR PAY THE PRICE 1–6 
(2005). 
 254  Panel Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US-
Upland Cotton), WT/DS267/R (Sep. 8,  2004); Appellate Body Report, 
United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005). 
 255  Panel Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US-
Upland Cotton), WT/DS267/R, ¶¶ 7.875–948, 8.1. 
 256 Appellate Body Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 
WT/DS267/AB/R, ¶ 8.1. 
 257 See Arbitration Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 
WT/DS267/ARB/1, WT/DS267/ARB/2, WT/DS267/ARB/2/Corr.1 (Aug. 8, 
2009). 
 258 For a short summary and status of the case, see WTO, US—UPLAND 
COTTON, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds267sum_e.pdf.  
 259 RANDY SCHNEPF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43817, 2014 FARM BILL 
PROVISIONS AND WTO COMPLIANCE 6, 10 (2014). 
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farmers and cotton producers against price and yield losses.260  Since 
these programs fall under the trade distorting amber box payments, 
cotton seems far from a settled issue.261  Clearly, Brazil remains 
unimpressed.262   
Although (unlike Brazil) they are not expected to challenge 
prohibited subsidies before the DSB, the so-called C4 countries in 
West Africa—Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali—that produce 
cotton at half the cost of the U.S., strongly campaigned against the 
U.S. cotton subsidy.263  They claimed to have sustained severe losses 
in export earnings (estimated at 1%–3% of their GDP) due to the U.S. 
cotton subsidy.264  Such a heavy subsidy highlights the travesty in aid 
to poor nations.  In 2001, for instance, Mali received $37 million in 
aid.265  However, the country claims to have lost $43 million in 
export revenue because of cotton subsidies in rich countries alone.266  
Besides, the amount of subsidies in the developed world defies 
economic sense.  Between 1999 and 2003, for example, U.S. cotton 
producers received a $13.1 billion subsidy for a crop estimated at 
$13.94 billion. 267  Under such circumstances, it is obvious that 
subsistence cotton farmers in poor countries, who cannot rely on their 
                                                
 260 Id. at 14–18. 
 261 See id. at 11–20. 
 262 See Steve Baragona, Brazil Says US Farm Bill Violates Trade Rules, 
THE VOICE OF AMERICA (Feb. 20, 2014, 7:55 PM), 
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 263  Michael J. Shumaker, Tearing the Fabric of the World Trade 
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supported by non-governmental organizations, such as Oxfam, have been 
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demanding the elimination of cotton subsidies).  
 264 UNDP, supra note 123, at 131; see generally Vance E. Hendrix, The 
Farm Bill of 2002, The WTO, and Poor African Farmers: Can They Co-
Exist? 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 227 (2004) (identifying severe losses in 
export earnings). 
 265 Blaise Compaore, President, Burkina Faso, Address on Cotton 
Submission to WTO Trade Negotiations Committee (June 11, 2003), 
available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/tnc_10june03_e.htm.  
 266 Id.  
 267  Stephen J. Powell & Andrew Schmitz, The Cotton and Sugar 
Subsidies Decision: WTO’s Dispute Settlement System Rebalances the 
Agreement on Agriculture, 10 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 288, 289 (2006). 
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governments for any support, do not stand a chance.  A World Bank 
study shows that half of the cost from cotton trade distortion to Sub-
Saharan Africa is largely attributed to U.S. cotton policies, with only 
a quarter of the cost due to policies of developing countries, and the 
remainder resulting from EU policies.268  Such a massive subsidy can 
suppress prices, shattering the livelihoods of poor farmers in poor 
countries.  However, poor countries hardly challenge rich countries’ 
subsidies before the DSB, mainly because the ultimate outcome 
depends on the power to retaliate, something which most of them  
lack terribly.269  Likewise, some of the EU’s agricultural subsidies 
were found to be in violation of the AoA.270  
The goal of export subsidies is to distort international trade.  
Thus, export subsidies are a direct antithesis of the theory of free 
trade and comparative advantage, which is the main reason why it 
was outlawed as far back as 1955 for industrial products in which 
rich nations have a comparative advantage.271  When it comes to 
agriculture (the only sector many poor nations stand a chance in 
global trade competition) export subsidies continue to distort trade.272  
To be sure, there has been some reduction of export subsidies in 
recent years, but that is due to rising market prices and other practical 
reasons associated with budget cuts in rich countries rather than the 
effectiveness of the AoA.273  Of all protectionist tools, export subsidy, 
which is the most trade distorting form of support, puts poor 
                                                
 268  See Kym Anderson & Ernesto Valenzuela, The World Trade 
Organization's Doha Cotton Initiative: A Tale of Two Issues 8–10 (World 
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3918, 2006). 
 269  See generally Luke Olson, Incentivizing Access to the WTO’s 
Dispute System for the Least Developed Countries: Legal Flaws in Brazil’s 
Upland Cotton Decision, 23 MINN. J. INT’L LAW 125 (2014) (explaining that 
substantive justice at the WTO seems to be a luxury that only the rich can 
afford; therefore, the least developed nations rarely resort to the WTO’s 
DSB). 
 270  See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Export 
Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS266/36 (Sept. 6, 2006); UNDP, supra note 123, 
at 130. 
 271 WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2006, at 189–90 (2006). 
 272 Id. 
 273 See generally Lilian Ruiz & Harry de Gorter, The Impacts of Export 
Subsidy Reduction Commitments in the Agreement on Agriculture, 3 
(conference paper, Am. Agric. Econ. Ass’n Annual Meeting, July 30-Aug. 2) 
(2000), available at http://purl.umn.edu/21844 (giving an overview of export 
subsidy commitments in the AoA). 
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countries at a harsh disadvantage.274  Simply put, existing subsidy 
levels make a mockery of the overriding objective of the AoA. 
 
4. DOMESTIC SUPPORT 
 
The SCM Agreement classifies subsidies by boxes that 
reflect traffic light colors: green (permitted), amber (to be reduced), 
and red (prohibited).275  Unsurprisingly, agriculture does not conform 
to the traffic light metaphor of the SCM.276  The AoA deviates from 
the “traffic rule” approach in two respects.  First, the AoA has no red 
box per se—subsidies that are trade distorting and thus are prohibited 
under the SCM agreement are tolerated in agriculture.277  Instead, the 
AoA aims for gradual reduction of trade distorting subsidies.278  
Accordingly, domestic support exceeding ‘amber box’ commitment 
levels is prohibited.279  Second, the AoA introduces a ‘blue box’ for 
subsidies that are tied to programs that limit production.280 
Amber Box: Article 6 of the AoA sets out commitments to 
reduce domestic support.281  Amber box support has a direct link to 
prices and production.282  Hence, commitments are expressed in 
terms of the total Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), calculated 
on a product-specific basis in accordance with Annexes 3 and 4.283  
Although Amber Box support is the most trade-distorting domestic 
support, all members are allowed to provide support up to a de 
                                                
 274  See Trade Reforms and Food Security: Conceptualizing the 
Linkages, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. 42 (2003).  With regard to market access, 
poor countries can do what rich countries can, i.e., erect trade barriers.  Id. at 
94.  However, because they are poor, they cannot subsidize their agricultural 
sectors like rich countries do.  Id. 
 275 Domestic support: Amber, Blue and Green Boxes, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd13_boxes_e.htm 
(last updated Dec. 1, 2004). 
 276 See id. 
 277 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra 
note 236, art. 3.1 (explaining that agriculture is the only exception to the rule 
prohibiting subsidies that fall under the Red Box). 
 278 MATTHIAS HERDEGEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW 252 (2014). 
 279 See AoA, supra note 56, art. 6.3. 
 280 See WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2006, supra note 271, at 193–94. 
 281 See AoA, supra note 56, art. 6.2. 
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. art. 6.1. 
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minimis threshold. 284   All member states may provide annual 
product-specific domestic support, not exceeding 5% of the value of 
their total annual basic agricultural production.  In addition, they may 
provide a non-product specific support (e.g. on fertilizer) of up to 5% 
of the value of their total agricultural production.285  For developing 
countries, the de minimis threshold is 10% in both cases.286  The 
amount of subsidy depends on the value of a country’s annual 
aggregate production, which means that countries that possess 
efficient techniques of production have a superior advantage over 
those that suffer from the perennial problem of production 
inefficiency.287  In terms of reduction, developed nations have agreed 
to cut their support by 20% over six years starting in 1995.288  
Developing countries must cut by 13% over ten years, while least 
developed countries are again exempt.289  In theory, this appears 
favorable to developing countries.  In reality, however, it is a 
different story, as these percentages (like all other reduction 
commitments) are calculated based on the base period total AMS.290  
Thus, while a 20% cut in rich countries still leaves a massive amount 
to farm support, 291  most developing countries did not maintain 
significant agricultural support during the base period.292  Even now, 
most developing countries are unable to provide support even at the 
permitted de minimis level.293  Poor countries regard agriculture as a 
source of tax revenue, not as a sector they ought to support. 
                                                
 284 Id. art. 6.3. 
 285 Id. art. 6.4. 
 286 See id. 
 287 Id. 
288 Agriculture: Fairer Markets for Farmers, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm (last 
visited June 14 2015). 
 289 Id. 
 290 AoA, supra note 56, art. 6.2. 
 291 FAO, THE RIGHT TO FOOD GUIDELINES: INFORMATION PAPERS AND 
CASE STUDIES 60 (2006).  Around 90% of farm subsidies are provided by 
developed nations.  Id. 
 292 See BOHMAN ET AL., supra note 78, at 5.  Thus, developed nations 
can provide an annual support up to 5% of the total value of agricultural 
product, and studies show some even maintain an amber support far beyond 
the permissible threshold.  Id. at 19. 
 293 Id. at 19. 
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The AoA prohibits countries from introducing new types of 
domestic support.294  Again, this puts developing countries at a 
disadvantage.  By the base period, developed countries already had 
various forms of support in place.  By contrast, most developing 
countries did not have meaningful support programs, and now they 
cannot introduce new ones.295  Note that the AMS is calculated in 
exclusion of the de minimis level of support, production-limiting 
agricultural support, as well as support under the long list of 
permissible programs deemed to be nontrade distorting or only 
minimally distorting.296  Hence, AMS does not reflect all government 
transfers to farmers.297  While average AMS has declined since the 
base period, overall agricultural support remains significantly 
higher.298  In monetary terms, overall government transfer to farmers 
in OECD countries was even higher in 2003 than it was in 1986–
1988.299  The laxity of the AoA can be gleaned from the fact that 
actual amber box support, even in rich nations, is lower than the 
permissible threshold. 
Green Box: Agricultural supports under this category are 
deemed to have no or minimal trade distorting effect; hence, they are 
                                                
 294 Id. at 5. 
 295 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Mission 
to the World Trade Org., ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/5/Add.2 (Feb. 4, 2009). 
 296 See AoA, supra note 56, at Annex 3 (noting that the AMS only 
covers support under the amber box that are above the de minimis threshold, 
and does not cover support programs falling under the blue box or green box 
category). 
 297 FAO, supra note 245, at 30. 
 298 See OECD, AGRICULTURAL POLICES IN OECD COUNTRIES: AT A 
GLANCE 29 (2010). 
 299 Agricultural support in OECD countries has fallen from 37% of the 
gross value of farm recipients in 1986–1988 base period to about 30% in 
2003–2005.  PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: MAPPING THE CHANGING 
CONTOURS OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 271 (6th ed. 2010).  However, the 
actual amount of annual support has increased from $242 billion to $273 
billion over the same period (over 90% of this amount is provided by the 
EU).  Id. at 288.  Even when agricultural support fell to “historic lows” as a 
result of high commodity prices and compellingly tight budgets particularly 
in Europe, OECD countries provided $227 billion in 2010.  See Agriculture: 
Support to agriculture at historic lows, OECD says, OECD (Sept. 9, 2011), 
http://www.oecd.org/document/48/0,3746,en_2649_37401_48714608_1_1_1
_37401,00.html. 
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permitted.300  However, many believe that Green Box subsidies do 
actually distort trade.301  The long list of programs that governments 
may legitimately employ to support their agricultural sectors under 
Annex 2 include rural development aids, agricultural research outlays, 
disease control, infrastructure, insurance and food security, and even 
“decoupled” direct payments to farmers, among others.302  The Green 
Box is essentially the compromise between the desire to reduce 
agricultural trade distortions and the almost intuitive apprehension of 
true liberalization.303  Currently, there is no limit on the amount of 
subsidies the government may provide under this category.304  As a 
result, the trajectory of Green Box support has been rising in many 
instances since the AoA came into force.  In the U.S., for instance, 
government payments in this category have soared from $46.1 billion 
in 1995 up to $125.1 billion in 2011.305  In 1999-2000, the U.S. spent 
$1.3 billion on rice subsidies when the total rice production was just 
$1.2 billion. 306   Meanwhile, Japan spends more money on 
                                                
 300 Arvind Panagariya, Liberalizing Agriculture, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61217/arvind-panagariya/liberalizing-
agriculture (last visited June 14, 2015).  Clearly, not all of those programs 
are nontrade distorting, and how minimal their distorting effect has also been 
controversial.  See generally World Trade Organization, Ministerial 
Declaration of 18 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/DEC (2005). 
 301  See WTO, WTO AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS: THE ISSUES, AND 
WHERE WE ARE NOW 55 (Dec 1, 2004). 
 302 See AoA, supra note 56, at Annex 2.  See also FAO, supra note 245, 
at 32.  As long as it is not related to current production, governments may 
make direct payment to their farmers; they are thus deemed to have no 
impact on farmers’ wealth or risk assessment in their agricultural investment 
decisions, although this remains controversial.  Id. 
 303 Cody A. Thacker, Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the Doha 
Round: The Search for a Modalities Draft, 33 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 721, 
745 (2005). 
 304 Id. 
 305 See Government Payments & the Farm Sector, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRIC., http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-commodity-
policy/government-payments-the-farm-sector.aspx#.U6RBiPldW8A (last 
updated Apr. 1, 2014). 
 306 Devinder Sharma, Zero Tolerance for Farm Subsidies, INDIA 
TOGETHER (Feb. 1, 2003), http://indiatogether.org/zerotolr-op-ed. 
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agricultural support than the overall value of its agricultural 
production.307 
Blue Box: This is another permitted support measure that 
may involve direct payments.  Blue Box supports are essentially 
Amber Box subsidies coupled with a condition that the recipient 
farmers limit trade-distorting production.308  Direct payment under 
the Blue Box may be provided based on fixed areas and yields, on 
85% or less of the base level of production, and based on livestock 
numbers.309  The ostensible rationale for introducing a new Blue Box 
in agriculture was to assist countries to reform their farm sectors.310  
It was particularly suited for the EU, where market support payments 
have historically either caused overproduction or were found to be 
inefficient. 311   Both Green Box and Blue Box subsidies are 
susceptible to abuse.  For instance, OECD countries are accused of 
manipulating these categories to reshuffle support programs that 
would have normally fallen under the Amber Box.312  As a result, 
while most of these nations may have met their AMS reduction 
commitments, the overall level of support remains unchanged since 
the Uruguay Round.313  Besides, there is no restriction on export of 
products that benefit from support under these two boxes.314  Because 
most developing countries lack the requisite resources to maintain 
these support programs, it is obvious that these exceptions mainly 
benefit rich nations. 
In general, the AoA has laid out the framework to establish 
a “fair and market-oriented” trading structure, which is the overriding 
goal of the agreement.315  However, actual trade commitments under 
the AoA are unsatisfactory.  It has not effectively addressed 
                                                
 307  Devinder Sharma, Protecting Agriculture: “Zero-Tolerance” on 
Farm Subsidies, INST. FOR POL’Y STUD. (Feb. 5, 2003), http://www.ips-
dc.org/protecting_agriculture_zero-tolerance_on_farm_subsidies/. 
 308 Domestic support, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro03_domestic_e.htm 
(last visited June 14, 2015). 
 309 See AoA, supra note 56, at art. 6.5. 
 310 Agriculture: Fairer Markets for Farmers, supra note 288. 
 311 Id. 
 312 See id. 
 313 UNDP, supra note 123, at 129. 
 314 DE SCHUTTER & STIFTUNG supra note 229, at 13. 
 315 VICTOR MOSOTI & AMBRA GOBENA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE RULE 
AND THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR: SELECTED IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 40–41 
(2007). 
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outstanding issues in agriculture dealing with market access, export 
competition, or domestic support.316  Substantively, agricultural trade 
remains as unfair and almost as distorted as ever.317  Both developed 
and developing nations are responsible for high tariff-induced 
distortions.318  In rich countries, high tariffs are reinforced by an 
array of support programs, ensuring that their markets are almost 
impenetrable. 319   The level of agricultural protectionism in 
industrialized countries “fl[ies] in the face of the rhetoric” about free 
trade and comparative advantage.320  If a deal negotiated mainly by 
rich countries was expected to address the development needs of 
poorer countries and thereby boost their ability to tackle poverty and 
deprivation, it has clearly failed to do so.321  Yet, agriculture is an 
unfinished business.  The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) 
presents another opportunity to meaningfully address the 
development needs of the poor and improve the credibility of the 
system.322 
 
C. DOHA ROUND NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRICULTURE 
 
The Havana Charter envisioned an international trade 
organization that would comprehensively deal with trade and 
                                                
 316 José Maria Garcia Alvarz-Coque, The Mediterranean and the WTO, 
in AGRI.MED: AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES, FOOD AND SUSTAINABLE RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION 32–33 (2006). 
 317 INFO. & EXTERNAL REL. DIVISION, WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 
51 (5th ed. 2005) [hereinafter INFO. & EXTERNAL REL. DIVISION].  Some rich 
WTO members are also accused of deliberately overestimating the level of 
protectionism during the base period (1986–1988) to ensure that the level of 
protectionism at the end of the implementation period remains steady. See 
Messerlin, supra note 13, at 4. 
 318 INFO. & EXTERNAL REL. DIVISION, supra note 317, at 98. 
 319 See Messerlin, supra note 13, at 5–6. 
 320 Alessndro Antimiani & Luca Salvatici, EU Trade Policies: 
Benchmarking Protection in a General Equilibrium Framework, 26 
(TRADEAG, Working Paper May 4, 2005). 
 321 U.N. DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: DIOLAGUES AT 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL 154–156, U.N. Sales No. E.08.II.A.11 
(2008). 
322 See generally NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT 
AGENDA, TURNING VISION INTO REALITY 1–2 (2005). 
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development issues within the UN framework.323  At about the same 
time the ITO Charter was being negotiated, a related, albeit less 
ambitious negotiation resulted in one of the most remarkable 
agreements—the GATT.324  Although the ITO was meant to serve as 
an umbrella institution that would administer the GATT, the latter 
had entered into force before the Havana Conference by virtue of the 
Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA).325  Despite its humble 
beginning, the GATT would prove to be an outstanding agreement 
and de facto institution until it eventually evolved into the WTO in 
1995.326  By contrast, the failure of the ITO project meant that 
development and social issues would remain on the fringes of trade 
negotiations for decades.327  Expansion of trade had practically been 
the sole goal of trade rounds during the GATT era.328  The DDA 
promises a break from that mercantilist tradition.  For the first time, 
                                                
 323 In its very first meeting on February 18, 1946, the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council adopted a resolution calling for an 
international conference on trade and employment.  See Econ. & Soc. 
Council Res. 13, Resolutions Adopted by the Econ. & Soc. Council, 3rd 
Sess., Sept. 11–Dec.10, 1946, U.N. Doc. E/245/Rev.1, (1946).  A series of 
negotiations took place until their culmination in 1948 by the adoption of the 
ITO Charter in Havana, Cuba.  See generally Havana Charter, supra note 48.  
Being the final act of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, the 
Havana Charter contains chapters devoted to development and employment 
issues.  See generally id.  
 324 CRAIG VANGRASSTEK, WTO, THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 44 (2013). 
 325 Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade in Goods: The GATT and Other 
Agreements Regulating Trade in Goods, 8 WORLD TRADE REV. 472, 472–74 
(2007).  
 326 Susan Ariel Aaronson, From GATTO to WTO: The Evolution of an 
Obsure Agency to one Percieved as Obstructing Democracy, EH.NET 
ENCYCOPEDIA OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS HISTORY (April 1, 2015, 4:38 
PM), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/from-gatt-to-wto-the-evolution-of-an-
obscure-agency-to-one-perceived-as-obstructing-democracy-2/.  
 327 Id. 
 328 The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ 
tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited June 14, 2015).  The previous eight GATT 
trade negotiation rounds dealt almost exclusively with the reduction or 
elimination of trade barriers.  Id.  Those rounds, usually named after the city 
where the negotiations were launched, are, chronologically: Geneva (1947); 
Annecy (1949); Torquay (1950); Geneva (1956); Dillon (1960–1961); 
Kennedy (1962–1967); Tokyo (1973–1979); and the Uruguay Round, the 
most remarkable and the final round under the GATT (1986–1994).  Id.  
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trade came to be viewed not as an end itself, but as a means to foster 
development and prosperity for all.329  With a view towards ensuring 
that “all . . . peoples . . . benefit from the increased opportunities and 
welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates,” member 
states declared their commitment to place the development needs of 
developing countries at the heart of the WTO’s work.330  Since no 
sector has greater significance to the development needs of the poor, 
liberalizing agricultural trade figures prominently in the first 
developed round in the history of the multilateral trading regime.331  
The avowed emphasis on the development needs and interests of 
developing nations seems to have bred high expectations in the 
developing world.332  The expectation, however, is in stark contrast 
with what developed nations are willing to concede.  The 
development idealism of Doha seems to have evaporated by the heat 
of mercantilist realism.333  
The Doha Round was set to be concluded by January 1, 
2005.334  Over a decade from that deadline, a deal on modalities 
framework has yet to be struck.  Successive attempts to salvage the 
Round have so far ended in failure.335  The Bali Agreement is the 
only exception in this regard, although the deal is only a miniscule 
                                                
 329 Vinaye Ancharaz, Can the Doha Round be Saved?, in THE FUTURE 
AND THE WTO: CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGES – A COLLECTION OF SHORT 
ESSAYS 102, 103–04 (2012).  
 330 Doha Declaration, supra note 39, ¶ 2. 
 331 Most developing countries have no greater need or interest than an 
improved market access for their agricultural products. Thus, the DDR was 
launched with the aim of, inter alea, improving market access; reducing 
(with a view to phasing out) all forms of export subsidies; and substantial 
reduction of trade-distorting domestic support in agriculture. Josef 
Schmidhuber & Seth Meyer, How Has the Treadmill Changed Direction? 
WTO Negotiations in the Light of a Potential New Global Agricultural 
Market Environment, in TACKLING AGRICULTURE IN THE POST-BALI CONTEXT 
33 (Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz ed., 2014).  In return, rich countries sought 
greater market access particularly in the areas of services and investment.  
See Doha Declaration, supra note 39, ¶¶ 2, 13–15.  
 332 See Doha Declaration, supra note 39,  ¶¶ 2, 13–15.  
 333 As WTO members “succumbed so completely to the pursuit of their 
commercial self-interest[,] . . . Doha Round has . . . lost nearly all links to its 
original purpose-trade liberalization to spur development . . .”  Raj Bhala, 
Resurrecting the Doha Round: Devilish Details, Grand Themes, and China 
Too, 45 TEX. INT'L L. J. 1, 4 (2009). 
 334 See Doha Declaration, supra note 39, ¶ 45.  
 335 Ancharaz, supra note 329, at 104–05. 
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portion of the DDA.336  In view of this fact, and the apparent shift of 
focus to regional and transcontinental trade alliances, the fate of the 
DDA seems increasingly uncertain.337  Disagreements on agriculture 
epitomize the rather cheerless history of Doha negotiations.338  A 
deal on a modalities framework was set to be struck at the Cancún 
Ministerial Conference in 2003, but resulted in failure.339  The failure 
was attributed primarily to the EU’s refusal to reform the CAP and 
the U.S.’s unwillingness to cut farm subsidies.340  In the summer of 
2004, negotiators agreed on the so-called July 2004 package.341  
Aside from a few specifics, such as placing a cap on Blue Box 
subsidies, the July 2004 package was limited to broad outlines.342  
The Hong Kong Ministerial Conference tried to address 
some of the most outstanding issues in agriculture.343  Member states 
agreed to eliminate all forms of export subsidies in agriculture by the 
                                                
 336 “The Bali package is only distantly related to the heart of the 2001 
agenda.”  Richard Baldwin, APEC-like Duties for a Post-Bali WTO, in 
BUILDING ON BALI, supra note 6, at 43.  
 337 Juegen Matthes, Reform of the WTO and the International Trading 
System: Which Place for the EU?, in THE FUTURE OF THE EU TRADE POLICY 
52, 63 (2011).  In addition to the existing regional trade alliances, several 
transcontinental trade agreements are being negotiated among different 
groups of countries. THE TIPP: THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED 
STATES 24–27 (Joaquin Roy & Roberto Dominguez eds., 2014).  
 338 Susan C. Schwab, After Doha, Why Negotiations Are Doomed and 
What We Should Do About It, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (June 2011), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67719/susan-c-schwab/after-doha. 
 339  Doha Declaration, supra note 39, at ¶3. Modalities are “the 
blueprints for the final deal” outlining the formulas and approaches on how 
to cut tariffs, reduce subsidies and support, and deal with other issues— 
cutting cotton subsidy by 50%—once modalities are agreed, a WTO member 
would apply the appropriate formula to compute the scale of quantitative 
reductions on the product concerned. See Briefing Report, Agriculture: 
Negotiating Modalitites, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (last visited June 14, 
2015), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/status_e/agric_e.htm. 
 340 See Cho, supra note 5, at 578; Messerlin, supra note 13, at 4. 
 341 See WTO, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 
2004, 7–8, WT/L/579 (2004).  
 342 The agreement is to limit blue box support to 5% of the overall value 
of agricultural production of a member.  Id. at A-1. 
 343 See WTO, Doha Work Programme Ministerial Declaration of 18 
December 2005, 6–12, WT/MIN(05)/DEC (2005).  
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end of 2013.344  They also declared to discipline in-kind international 
food aid so as to ensure that it would not be used as a form of indirect 
export subsidy or to simply dispose surplus production.345  Certain 
principles in favor of developing countries were also agreed upon.346  
However, trade ministers could not agree on modalities for both 
agricultural and non-agricultural market access (NAMA).347  
With no sign of a breakthrough, negotiators gathered in 
Geneva in the summer of 2008 hoping to forge a deal on 
modalities. 348   Once again they could not narrow down their 
differences on key issues. 349   The 2008 draft modalities for 
agriculture outlines a tiered formula of reduction of domestic support 
and tariffs while  seeking to eliminate export subsidies.350  In regards 
to the Overall Trade-Distorting Support (OTDS), for example, the 
highest tier (e.g., for the Base Level OTDS exceeding $60 billion) 
                                                
 344 Id. at 6, 11. 
 345  Simone Heri & Christian Haberli, Can the World Trade 
Organization Ensure that Food Aid is Genuine? 44-45 (NCCR Trade Reg,, 
Working Paper No. 2009/19).  Food aid may have similar effect as other 
forms of export subsidy—the West, particularly the U.S., has traditionally 
been accused of using aid to dump surplus food in the third world, thereby 
killing off local production and creating aid dependency.  See JOSLING ET AL., 
supra note 158, at 32–33.  In the early 1950s, for example, concessional sales 
and donations accounted for around 60 percent of USA’s wheat exports.  See 
id.  Thus, there is a desire to discipline international food aid.  See, e.g., 
WTO, Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, TN/AG/W/4/Rev. 4 (2008). 
 346 Id.  
 347 See Bernard Hoekman & Marcelo Olarreaga, The WTO after 
Cancun, 38 INTERECONOMICS 232, 232–234 (2003). 
 348 Heading to Geneva without even a deal on modalities, negotiators 
must have felt a sense of urgency to at least clinch a deal on modalities, 
particularly in view of the economic turmoil.  Pascal Lamy himself sent an 
optimistic signal when he declared, “[we are] within reach of a major step in 
our drive to conclude the Round this year . . . .” Trade Negotiations 
Committee, Lamy Says Time for Action is Now Amid Economic Threats, 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZAITON (July 21, 2008), 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news08_e/meet08_chair_21july08_e.ht
m.   
 349 On the fourth day of the negotiations, it was declared that despite 
intensive negotiations, positions on agriculture, Cotton, market access 
formula for developed countries, sensitive products, special products and 
SSM as well as NAMA, “remain[ed] too far apart.” Id.  
 350 RANDY SCHNEPF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22927, WTO Doha 
Round: Implicaitons for U.S. Agriculture 10–11 (2014). 
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requires a 75% or 85% cut.351  This tier concerns the EU.352  Second 
tier reduction (e.g., for the Base Level OTDS of $10 billion to $60 
billion) would be 66% or 73%.353 The U.S. and Japan fall under this 
tier.354  That would bring the U.S. OTDS from the current ceiling of 
$48.2 billion down to around $16.4 billion or $13 billion. This may 
look like a big scale down, but in reality, that amounts to almost no 
cut as the average current OTDS of the U.S. stands at about $14 
billion.355  In reciprocity, developing countries had to agree that they 
would use the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) only in the event 
of an import surge by a volume of 40% or more.356  In earlier 
negotiations, the U.S. conditioned its farm subsidy cuts on tariff 
reductions in the EU and the tightening of special protection, 
including those designed to safeguard livelihoods in developing 
countries.357 This prompted the Indian negotiator to lament, “I’m 
willing to negotiate commerce, but subsistence, livelihood, security, I 
will not be willing to negotiate.”358  SSM would prove to be one of 
the sticking points on which convergence could not be attained, as 
July talks collapsed unsurprisngly. 
The July draft modalities framework was revised once 
again—the fourth time that year—and was circulated in December 
2008.359  The latest draft adopts single numbers rather than ranges for 
                                                
351  In agriculture, OTDS includes Amber Box, Blue Box, and de 
minimis supports. See Overall Trade-distorting Domestic Support (OTDS), 
WTO Glossary, https://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/glossary_e/glossary_e.htm (last visited June 14, 2015). 
 352 Id.  
 353 WTO, Revised Draft Modalitites for Agriculture, supra note 345, at 
2–3. 
 354 Id.  
 355  “Since the introduction of the 2002 Farm Act, farm program 
payments have averaged about $14 billion per fiscal year.” Farm and 
Commodity Policy: Government Payments and the Farm Sector, USDA 
(2007) http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/farmpolicy/gov-pay.htm. 
 356  WTO Mini-Ministerial Evades Collapse, as Lamy Finds ‘Way 
Forward’, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. (July, 26 2008), 
http://ictsd.org/i/wto/geneva2008/englishupdates/14493/. 
 357 Larry Elliot & Ashley Seager, Despair as Five Years of World Trade 
Talks Fail, THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 2006), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,,1811387,00.html. 
 358 Id. 
 359 Unofficial Guide to the 6 December 2008 ‘Revised Draft Modalities’, 
WTO (Dec. 9, 2008), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_modals_dec08_e.htm. 
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domestic support and tariff reductions.360  It also slightly modifies 
provisions on special safeguard, tariff simplification, and flexibilities 
for different member states.361  Aside from these minor modifications 
the December modalities text is not remarkably different from its 
July predecessor.362  
 
1.   THE BALI PACKAGE 
 
The 2008 breakdown sank the DDA into a state of paralysis.  
As chances of resurrecting the DDA looked bleak, negotiators agreed 
in 2011 to work on a smaller package of selected issues. 363  
Conceding that it was “unlikely that all elements of the Doha 
Development Round could be concluded simultaneously in the near 
future,” ministers decided to pick “low hanging fruit.”364  The change 
in approach seems to work as trade ministers finally reached a deal at 
the ninth WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali, Indonesia, in 
December 2013.365  Negotiators, long hankering for success, greeted 
the Bali package with a sigh of relief.366  Beyond the euphoria, 
however, what is the significance of the Bali deal to the broader 
DDA?  Concerning agricultural trade liberalization, it is tempting to 
say nothing at all.  Indeed, the deal on agriculture represents more of 
a reversion to protectionism than a leap towards liberalization.  
The Bali package is an agreement on three issues: trade 
facilitation, agriculture, and development.367  The trade facilitation 
leg, which seeks to simplify customs procedures by reducing costs 
and enhancing efficiency, is probably the most important 
                                                
 360 Id.  
 361Id.  
 362 See id. 
 363 See Day 3: Samoa and Montenegro Join Russia with Membership 
Agreed, as Ministers Wrap Up Conference, WTO (Dec. 17, 2011), 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/mn11a_17dec11_e.htm.  
 364 Id.  
365  See Christophe Bellmann, The Bali Agreement: Implications for 
Development and the WTO, 5 INT’L DEV. POL’Y 2, 2–3 (2014). 
 366 “‘For the first time in our history: the WTO has truly delivered,’ said 
Director General Roberto Azevêdo.”  See Days 3, 4 and 5: Round-the-clock 
Consultations Produce ‘Bali Package’, WTO (Dec. 7, 2013), 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/mc9sum_07dec13_e.htm. 
 367 See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 7 
December 2013, WT/MIN(13)/38, WT/L/913 (2013) [hereinafter Bali 
Ministerial Declaration]. 
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breakthrough achieved in Bali.368  The agreement on agriculture, 
which was a result of negotiations between rich nations and the G-33, 
led by India, in turn covers three areas: public stockholding for food 
security purposes, tariff-rate quota administration, and export 
competition. 369   The decision on public stockholding grants 
developing countries an interim immunity from legal challenges even 
when their domestic support exceeds the permissible limit.370  While 
this may please countries such as India, LCDs have limited resources 
to maintain meaningful public stockholding programs.  Clearly, 
development is the only way to integrate LCDs into the global 
economy.  Yet, on the issue of development, the Bali package is, as 
usual, limited to best endeavor clauses.  
There has never been a shortage of political declarations to 
assist developing countries. 371   For example, with regard to 
improving market access, rich WTO members agreed during the 
Hong Kong Ministerial to provide duty-free and quota free market 
access “for all products originating from all LCDs by 2008.”372  They 
likewise vowed to address the issue of cotton within the agriculture 
negotiations.373  However, the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration 
remains an empty promise.  Similarly, the Bali Agreement does not 
add anything substantive other than recycling broken promises.374  
Importantly, with agricultural labor productivity less than 1% of the 
level in rich nations, LCDs stand little chance in global agricultural 
trade competition without a transfer of agricultural technology, as 
mandated by the Doha Declaration.375  However, there has been no 
material progress in this regard. 
Similarly, the Bali package does not contain a legally 
binding agreement on export competition.376  It merely represents a 
                                                
 368 See id. 
 369 Id. 
 370 See id.  ¶ 2.  
 371  See WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 22 December 2005, 
WT/MIN(05)/DEC, Annex F, Decision 36 (2005) [hereinafter Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declaration]. 
 372 Id.   
 373 Id.  
 374 See generally Bali Ministerial Declaration, supra note 367 (the Bali 
Decision in this regard is for developed countries to “seek to improve their 
existing duty-free and quota-free” access for LCD’s products). 
 375 See Doha Declaration, supra note 39, at ¶ 37.   
 376 See Bali Ministerial Declaration, supra note 367, at ¶ 8. 
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declaration to exhibit restraint in using export subsidies. 377  
Negotiators, acknowledging “that all forms of export subsidies and 
all measures with equivalent effect are a highly trade distorting and 
protectionist form of support,” expressed their regret that they were 
unable to keep their words on eliminating export subsidies by the end 
of 2013 as agreed in the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration.378  With 
past failures in mind, they did not dare to set a timeframe for the 
elimination of export subsidy this time.379  Generally, the absence of 
any material progress with respect to market access, export 
competition, and technology transfer means the Bali deal has little 
significance to the development needs of poor countries.  Virtually 
all outstanding issues of agricultural trade and development in 
general remain unaddressed.  
 
D. AGRICULTURE: THE KEY TO WTO’S CREDIBILITY 
 
As years pass by, the skepticism on whether the Doha 
Round will ever be completed grows.380  Trade negotiations have 
collapsed and deadlines have been missed before, yet the multilateral 
trading system has only grown stronger.381  Thus, there is room for 
optimism.  However, it is also important to recognize that Doha is 
radically different from previous rounds for a few fundamental 
reasons.382  First, the North-South trade dynamics have shifted in a 
more profound way than ever before.383  It is sometimes claimed that 
the global South wielded greater collective leverage in the 1970s than 
today.  Yet while the South has traditionally campaigned for 
preferential treatment, actual trade rules have almost always been 
                                                
 377 See id. 
 378 Id. ¶ 1. 
 379 Id. ¶ 13 (agreeing to instead review the issue at the 10th Ministerial in 
2015). 
 380 Bhala, supra note 333, at 9 (“[F]ollowing the July 2008 collapse . . . 
only truly optimistic trade souls could keep faith in the resurrection of the 
Doha Round.”). 
 381 See Schwab, supra note 338.  
 382 There are, of course, other incidental factors, such as the global 
economic crisis, making economic recovery the preoccupation of many 
governments.  Also, a severe economic crisis, attributable mainly to 
excessive deregulation, is not a good advertisement upon which to sell the 
virtues of the open market.   
 383 See WILL MARTIN, WORLD BANK, TRADE POLICIES, DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES, AND GLOBALIZATION 13 (2001). 
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determined by the North.384  The rise of emerging powers is changing 
that tradition. 385   Developing countries have never been more 
assertive.386  More importantly, Doha is the first development round 
in GATT/WTO history.387  While the plea of developing countries 
for a pro-development trade structure had always fallen on deaf ears, 
the widespread popular discontent and powerful protests in Seattle 
and elsewhere against the WTO model of globalization seemed to 
finally force the trading regime to change course.388  It is important to 
remember that the Doha Round was launched against the backdrop of 
a failed attempt to start the Millennium Round of trade negotiations 
at the Third Ministerial Conference.389  However, for the WTO to 
genuinely embrace development, is almost tantamount to altering its 
mercantilist ethos and identity. 390   Historically, the ITO project 
collapsed while the GATT thrived because development and social 
issues do not sit well with mercantilism.391  
However, there is no getting around the longstanding quest 
for a pro-development trading system.  First, unlike when there was 
little scrutiny about the trading regime outside of a few experts in the 
field, the WTO is now a household name. People from poor farmers 
                                                
 384 See Cho, supra note 5, at 594–98. 
 385 See Lamy, supra note 7. 
 386 See Pedro de Motta Viega, Brazil and the G-20 Group of Developing 
Countries, WTO, available at 
https://www.wto.org/ENGLISH/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case7_e.htm 
(last visited June 14, 2015). 
 387 Doha Round Trade Talks – Explained, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 
2012), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/sep/03/doha-
round-trade-talks-explainer 
 388 See generally  BRIGID GAVIN, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND 
GLOBALIZATION: TOWARDS GLOBAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE (Edward 
Elgar Publ’g, Inc., 2001). 
 389 The Third Ministerial Conference that convened in Seattle at the end 
of 1999 was set to launch a new round of trade negotiations (the first within 
the WTO framework) that, if launched, would have been called the 
Millennium Round.  Disagreements on major trade negotiations compounded 
by a massive protest (widely known as “Battle of Seattle”) meant that the 
launching of a new round had to be put on hold.  
 390 See Cho, supra note 5, at 583. 
 391 In reality, development and social issues are seen as liabilities, rather 
than as the ultimate goals of the multilateral trade, as they do not suit the 
pursuit of commercial self-interest.  While developed countries resist any 
substantive relation of trade to development, developing countries object to 
the integration of labor standards into the WTO system.  
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in Africa and Asia to factory workers in the developed world know 
how their interests can be affected by the WTO.  Thanks to the 
WTO’s own success and the information age that we live in, trade 
deals can no longer go unexamined.  Crucially, as the WTO’s own 
charter declares, trade is not an end in itself; it is a means to a 
socioeconomic end.392  The WTO is now being challenged to remain 
true to its charter.  There is hardly a more legitimate demand.  The 
question concerns the fundamental tenets of international trade, and 
is thus simply not going to go away because WTO members turn to 
regional and megaregional trade alliances. 
It cannot be emphasized enough that the rationale for free 
trade lies not in the accumulation of aggregate wealth, but in the 
advancement of human welfare.  According to Adam Smith, a 
trading system that is sustained by what he calls “powerful 
merchants” and “manufacturers”—the counterparts to today’s 
corporations—which serve their narrow commercial interests at the 
expense of the wider society belongs to mercantilism.393  Since 
mercantilists believe that trade should be harnessed towards wealth 
and power aggrandizement, they advocate trade-distorting measures, 
such as import barriers and export stimulants.394  By contrast, the 
kind of trade advocated by classical political economists has to be 
both free and fair, that offers a fair chance for all, big and small.  
Equity and fairness are central to the idea of free trade advocated by 
Adam Smith.395  
As the above analysis has shown, the WTO agricultural 
trade remains neither free nor fair.  In all material aspects, it embodies 
                                                
 392 See generally Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 1. 
 393 See SMITH, supra note 26, at 626.               
 394 Id. at 393–95. 
 395 Id. at 609 (writing with regard to labor exploitation, “it is not 
by their work, but by the complete work of the weavers, that our 
great master manufacturers make their profits . . . By extorting from 
the legislature bounties upon the exportation of their own linen, high 
duties upon the importation of all foreign linen…they endeavor to 
sell their own goods as dear as possible . . . They are as intent to keep 
down the wages of their own weavers, as the earnings of the poor 
spinners, and it is by no means for the benefit of the workman . . . It 
is the industry which is carried on for the benefit of the rich and the 
powerful, that is principally encouraged by our mercantilist system.  
That which is carried on for the benefit of the poor and the indigent is 
too often, either neglected, or opposed.”). 
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mercantilism.  Indeed, fundamental criticisms directed at the WTO 
today mirror Adam Smith’s refutation of mercantilism.396  In view of 
this, the DDA represents a classic dilemma for WTO members: a 
dilemma between continuing the pursuits of self-interest 
(mercantilism) and advancing the common good (development).  If 
the DDA is indeed about development, reforming agricultural trade is 
imperative, not just because agriculture has profound significance to 
development, but because the sector also remains indefensibly 
distorted.  The WTO’s own credibility is at stake.  Even without 
explicit references to the far-reaching goals justifying the WTO’s 
institutional existence, the legitimacy of the trading regime (of any 






Generally speaking, industrialized nations have a superior 
comparative advantage over developing countries in almost every 
sector; from trade in industrial products to the so-called new issues 
brought into the multilateral trading system during the Uruguay 
Round.  For many developing countries, agriculture represents the 
only area in which they stand a chance in global trade competition.  
Thus, even from a mercantilist point of view (i.e., without referring 
to the issue of development), developing countries have a strong case 
in seeking improved market access for their agricultural products.  
Yet, of all the sectors, agricultural trade remains highly protected and 
distorted.  Unarguably, the prevailing level of protectionism does not 
cohere with the idea of a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading 
system. 
                                                
 396 See id.  Classical political economists refuted the doctrine of 
mercantilism on economic and social virtue grounds.  Smith argued 
that merchants and manufacturers contrive to sustain mercantilism 
for they derive “the greatest advantage” from the monopoly of the 
domestic market (due to the imposition of high duties or import 
prohibitions) at the expense of farmers, laborers, smaller traders and 
the society at large, paralelling modern day accusations of corporate 
lobby and trade rules tailed to the interests of big businesses, at the 
cost of social and development values.  Id.  
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Agriculture holds the key for the conclusion of Doha 
Development Round.  Without addressing outstanding issues of 
agricultural trade, the round cannot be a development round.  But 
how can WTO members turn agriculture into a building block of the 
round?  The choice is both simple and vexing.  It is simple because it 
is mainly a question of translating declarations that have been made 
into concrete agreements.  That is, to establish a genuinely free and 
fair agricultural trading system.  However, non-binding political 
declarations should not be mistaken for political will.  A free and fair 
agricultural trading system does not admit export subsidy, which is 
the complete antithesis of such a system.  Existing three-digit 
agricultural tariff levels do not blend in the idea of free trade.  Some 
countries’ farm support in the Green Box category alone exceeds the 
total GDP of most WTO members, and that is hardly compatible with 
free and fair agricultural trade. However, the failure of WTO 
negotiations over the last thirteen meetings is proof that the political 
will to dismantle all these protectionist tools and create a truly fair 
and development oriented trade structure is lacking.  It cannot be 
emphasized enough that the challenge is formidable.  Yet, there is no 
other option than to rise up to the challenge; not only because it is 
morally imperative, but also because equitable development is crucial 
for a peaceful and prosperous world on the promise of which the 
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